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Preface 
 
The World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2015 in Davos-Klosters included 
a session entitled, Keeping "Worldwide" in the Web. Participants discussed a 
number of challenges facing the open global Internet, which has become a 
key driver of global wealth creation, socio-cultural enrichment and human 
empowerment in recent decades. Among the top concerns raised was the 
emerging fragmentation of the Internet along multiple lines due to 
developments in the technical, governmental and commercial realms. In the 
months to follow, it became clear that while this fragmentation was of growing 
concern to many close observers of and participants in the global Internet 
ecosystem, there was no widespread consensus as to its nature and scope. 
As such, with the launch of the World Economic Forum’s multi-year Future of 
the Internet Initiative (FII), Internet fragmentation stood out as one of the 
priority topics meriting exploration in the context of the FII’s Governance on 
the Internet project. 
 
To facilitate the discussion, the Forum invited William J. Drake, who had been 
a discussion leader at the Annual Meeting session, to organize a small team 
of experts that could produce a background paper on the subject. This team 
included Vinton Cerf, widely regarded as a “father of the Internet”, and 
Wolfgang Kleinwächter, a leading figure in global Internet governance 
institutions. The team’s mandate was to contribute to the emergence of a 
common baseline understanding of Internet fragmentation by undertaking a 
horizontal mapping of the issues and dynamics involved. That is, its intended 
value-added would be in presenting a big picture overview of a range of 
examples illustrating the trend towards fragmentation, rather than in offering 
finely detailed portraits of any of them. 
 
From the outset of the process, the World Economic Forum engaged a 
number of interested participants in the FII’s Core Community, as well as a 
group of external experts. The research in progress was discussed both at 
meetings held in Geneva and New York and on conference calls to engage in 
dialogue and gather feedback, and over a dozen written replies to the draft 
version were received as well. All these inputs were taken into consideration 
by the team of authors. Ultimately though, the views expressed in the paper 
are solely those of the authors working in their individual capacities, and not 
necessarily those of their respective organizations, or of the World Economic 
Forum itself or its Members or Partners. 
 
I would like to thank the authors for their intellectual leadership in developing 
this analysis, which is an important, new resource for everyone concerned 
about the evolution of the Internet. I would also like to express appreciation to 
the informal multistakeholder group of experts who reviewed earlier drafts and 
provided comments to the authors. The Forum particularly wishes to 
recognize the leadership and support of the trustees and partners of the 
Global Challenge Initiative on the Future of the Internet, of which this 
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workstream is a part, as well as the Initiative's Co-Heads, Mark Spelman and 
Alex Wong, and its Director, Danil Kerimi. 
 
As a first-cut overview of the fragmentation landscape, this paper will help to 
set a foundation for further analyses and action-oriented dialogues among FII 
participants and within the international community at large. It was 
commissioned for the explicit purpose of providing a more informed basis for 
the identification and prioritization by all stakeholders of potential areas of 
collaboration, including the definition of good practices or policy models that 
can serve as a constructive example for others. A first step down this path will 
be taken with the Annual Meeting 2016 session on Internet without Borders. 
As the title of this session suggests, the Forum’s engagement in this issue 
area is guided by a conviction that keeping the Internet as open and 
interoperable as possible is essential if we are to sustain and expand its 
capacities to promote global well-being in the years ahead. 
 
 
Richard Samans 
Member of the Managing Board 
 
Geneva, January 2016 
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Executive Summary 
 
A growing number of thought leaders have expressed concerns over the past 
two years that the Internet is in some danger of splintering or breaking up into 
loosely coupled islands of connectivity. A number of potentially troubling 
trends driven by technological developments, government policies and 
commercial practices have been rippling across the Internet’s layers, from the 
underlying infrastructures up to the applications, content and transactions it 
conveys. But there does not appear to be a clearly defined, widely shared 
understanding of what the term, fragmentation, does and does not entail. 
 
The growth of these concerns does not indicate a pending cataclysm. The 
Internet remains stable and generally open and secure in its foundations, and 
it is morphing and incorporating new capabilities that open up extraordinary 
new horizons, from the Internet of Things and services to the spread of block 
chain technology and beyond. Moreover, the increasing synergies between 
the Internet and revolutionary changes in other technological and social 
arenas are leading us into a new era of global development that can be seen 
as constituting a fourth industrial revolution. But there are challenges 
accumulating which, if left unattended, could chip away to varying degrees at 
the Internet’s enormous capacity to facilitate human progress. We need to 
take stock of these, and to begin a more structured dialogue about their 
nature, scope and distributed collective management.  
 
The purpose of this document is to contribute to the emergence of a common 
baseline understanding of Internet fragmentation. It maps the landscape of 
some of the key trends and practices that have been variously described as 
constituting Internet fragmentation and highlights 28 examples. A distinction is 
made between cases of technical, governmental and commercial 
fragmentation. The technical cases generally can be said to involve 
fragmentation “of” the Internet, or its underlying physical and logical 
infrastructures. The governmental and commercial cases often more directly 
involve fragmentation “on” the Internet, or the transactions and cyberspace it 
conveys, although they also can involve the infrastructure as well. With the 
examples cited placed in these three conjoined baskets, we can get a holistic 
overview of their nature and scope and more readily engage in the sort of 
dialogue and cooperation that is needed. 
 
Section 1: The Nature of Internet Fragmentation 
 
The open Internet provides a baseline approach from which fragmentation 
departs and against which it can be assessed. Particularly important are the 
notions of global reach with integrity; a unified, global and properly governed 
root and naming/numbering system; interoperability; universal accessibility; 
the reusability of capabilities; and permissionless innovation. 
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The conventional four-layer technical model of the Internet can analytically 
supplemented by the addition of a fifth content and transactions layer.  
 
Working definitions are proposed for three forms of fragmentation: 
 
Technical Fragmentation: conditions in the underlying infrastructure that 
impede the ability of systems to fully interoperate and exchange data packets 
and of the Internet to function consistently at all end points.  
 
Governmental Fragmentation: Government policies and actions that constrain 
or prevent certain uses of the Internet to create, distribute, or access 
information resources.  
 
Commercial Fragmentation: Business practices that constrain or prevent 
certain uses of the Internet to create, distribute, or access information 
resources.  
 
In each case, fragmentation may vary greatly according to a number of 
dimensions or attributes. The paper highlights four in particular:  
 
• Occurrence: whether a type of fragmentation exists or is a potential 
• Intentionality: whether fragmentation is the result of deliberate action or an 
unintended consequence 
• Impact: whether fragmentation is deep, structural and configurative of 
large swaths of activity or even the Internet as a whole, or rather more 
shallow, malleable and applicable to a narrowly bounded set of processes, 
transactions and actors 
• Character: whether fragmentation is generally positive, negative, or neutral 
 
Section 2: Technical Fragmentation 
 
When the Internet concept was first articulated, a guiding vision was that 
every device on the Internet should be able to exchange packets with any 
other device. Universal connectivity was assumed to be a primary benefit. But 
there are a variety of ways in which the original concept has been eroded 
through a complex evolutionary process that has unfolded slowly but is 
gathering pockets of steam in the contemporary era.  
 
Four issue-areas are reviewed, including Internet addressing, interconnection, 
naming and security. Within these categories, 12 kinds of fragmentation of 
varying degrees of significance are identified: 
 
1. Network Address Translation  
2. IPv4 and IPv6 incompatibility and the dual-stack requirement 
3. Routing corruption  
4. Firewall protections 
5. Virtual private network isolation and blocking  
 5 
6. TOR “onion space” and the “dark web”  
7. Internationalized Domain Name technical errors 
8. Blocking of new gTLDs 
9. Private name servers and the split-horizon DNS  
10. Segmented Wi-Fi services in hotels, restaurants, etc. 
11. Possibility of significant alternate DNS roots  
12. Certificate authorities producing false certificates  
 
Section 3: Governmental Fragmentation 
 
The most common imagery of “governmental fragmentation” is of the global 
public Internet being divided into digitally bordered “national Internets”. 
Movement in the direction of national segmentation could entail, inter alia, 
establishing barriers that impede Internet technical functions, or block the flow 
of information and e-commerce over the infrastructure. Pressure and trends in 
this direction do exist, as do counter-pressures. 
 
Six issue-areas are reviewed, including: content and censorship; e-commerce 
and trade; national security; privacy and data protection; data localization; and 
fragmentation as an overarching national strategy. Within these categories, 
10 kinds of fragmentation of varying degrees of significance are identified: 
 
1. Filtering and blocking websites, social networks or other resources offering 
undesired contents 
2. Attacks on information resources offering undesired contents 
3. Digital protectionism blocking users’ access to and use of key platforms 
and tools for electronic commerce 
4. Centralizing and terminating international interconnection 
5. Attacks on national networks and key assets  
6. Local data processing and/or retention requirements 
7. Architectural or routing changes to keep data flows within a territory  
8. Prohibitions on the transborder movement of certain categories of data 
9. Strategies to construct “national Internet segments” or “cybersovereignty”  
10. International frameworks intended to legitimize restrictive practices  
 
Section 4: Commercial Fragmentation 
 
A variety of critics have charged that certain commercial practices by 
technology companies also may contribute to Internet fragmentation. The 
nature of the alleged fragmentation often pertains to the organization of 
specific markets and digital spaces and the experiences of users that choose 
to participate in them, but sometimes it can impact the technical infrastructure 
and operational environments for everyone. Whether or not one considers 
commercial practices as meriting the same level of concern as, say, data 
localization is of course a matter of perspective. Certainly there are significant 
concerns from the perspectives of many Internet users, activists and 
competing providers in global markets. As such, the issues are on the table in 
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the growing global dialogue about fragmentation, and they are therefore 
discussed here.  
 
Five issue-areas are reviewed, including: peering and standardization; 
network neutrality; walled gardens; geo-localization and geo-blocking; and 
infrastructure-related intellectual property protection. Within these categories, 
10 kinds of fragmentation of varying degrees of significance are identified: 
 
1. Potential changes in interconnection agreements 
2. Potential proprietary technical standards impeding interoperability in the 
IoT 
3. Blocking, throttling, or other discriminatory departures from network 
neutrality 
4. Walled gardens 
5. Geo-blocking of content 
6. Potential use of naming and numbering to block content for the purpose of 
intellectual property protection 
 
Section 5: Conclusions 
 
Drawing on the survey of fragmentation examples, a “top 10” set of cases is 
suggested that are a) fairly pressing or at least worth keeping a close watch 
of; b) worth examining in greater detail than was possible in this paper; and/or 
c) potentially amenable to progress through multistakeholder dialogue and 
collaboration. These are: 
• Sustained delays or failure to move from IPv4 to IPv6 
• Widespread blocking of new gTLDs 
• Significant alternate root systems 
• Filtering and blocking due to content 
• Digital protectionism  
• Local data processing and/or retention requirements 
• Prohibitions on the transborder movement of certain categories of data 
• Strategies for “national Internet segments” or “cybersovereignty”  
• Walled gardens 
• Geo-blocking 
 
Taking into account these 10 cases and the preceding discussion, six sets of 
challenges stand out as being both pressing and particularly amenable to 
productive analysis and multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation: 
• Fragmentation as Strategy 
• Data Localization 
• Digital Protectionism 
• Access via Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) 
• Walled Gardens 
• Information Sharing  
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Introduction 
 
Internet fragmentation has become a rather hot topic of late. A growing 
number of thought leaders in government, the private sector, the Internet 
technical community, civil society and academia have expressed concerns 
over the past two years that the Internet is in some danger of splintering or 
breaking up into loosely coupled islands of connectivity. Usually these 
statements have not been elaborated on at any length, and have offered by 
way of illustration just a few strains or flash points of tension. Nevertheless, 
the concern has been picked up and repeated by enough media outlets and 
mentioned in enough global Internet discussions to transition from a murmur 
to a near-meme.  
 
The most widely noted catalyst for this emerging discourse has been the June 
2013 revelations by Edward Snowden regarding mass surveillance. In the 
wake of his disclosures, numerous governments began to openly discuss or 
actively pursue the localization of certain types of data and communication 
flows within their territorial jurisdictions. But in reality, as significant as these 
developments have been, they really are only the tip of the iceberg.  
 
For some time now, a number of potentially troubling trends driven by 
technological developments, government policies and commercial practices 
have been rippling across the Internet’s layers, from the underlying 
infrastructures up to the applications, content and transactions it conveys. 
Some of these are of recent vintage, but others are the result of longer-term 
processes of evolution. The diversity of these trends means that different 
actors seem to experience and visualize fragmentation differently. In 
consequence, there does not appear to be a clearly defined, widely shared 
understanding of what the term does and does not entail. 
 
In a sense, we may be encountering a virtual variant on Miles’s law of 
bureaucratic policy-making, i.e. “Where you stand depends on where you sit.” 
For some in the Internet technical community, fragmentation seems to refer in 
the first instance to such possibilities as multiple and incompatible root zone 
files and associated naming and numbering systems; suboptimal changes in 
the routing architecture; the spread of incompatible technical standards; an 
increasingly problematic transition from IPv4 to IPv6; and so forth.  
 
In contrast, for some in the business community, the term seems to refer 
more to variations in national policies that add to the cost of or even block 
commercial transactions, and especially to new policies and practices that 
interfere with the transborder flow of data, cloud services, globalized value 
chains, the industrial Internet, and so on. For many in civil society, 
fragmentation seems to refer instead to the spread of government censorship, 
blocking, filtering and other access limitations, as well as to proprietary 
platforms and business models that in some measure impede end users’ 
abilities to freely create, distribute and access information. Some people even 
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argue that socio-cultural trends like the increasing linguistic diversity of 
cyberspace contributes to fragmentation. In short, many people seem to 
construe fragmentation in ways that reflect their respective experiences and 
priorities. 
 
This situation is not unexpected, given the number and variety of emerging 
data points suggesting trends towards fragmentation. Nor is it unprecedented; 
after all, many other core issues involved in Internet governance and policy 
today remain contested. Consider for example the ongoing debates about the 
precise meaning of terms like network neutrality, cybersecurity, or the global 
public interest. Without shared definitions or at least bounded understandings 
of what is or is not encompassed by such terms, it can be very difficult to 
assess emerging trends and the costs and benefits that may be involved, or 
to evaluate the potential solutions. 
 
So we are in a quandary. There is a growing sense in many quarters that this 
extraordinary technology that has been a critically important source of new 
wealth creation, economic opportunity, socio-political development and 
personal empowerment is experiencing serious new strains and even 
dangers. This is not to say that some sort of cataclysm is anticipated; the 
Internet remains stable and generally open and secure in its foundations, and 
it is morphing and incorporating new capabilities that open up extraordinary 
new horizons, from the Internet of Things and services to the spread of block 
chain technology and beyond. Moreover, the increasing synergies between 
the Internet and revolutionary changes in other technological and social 
arenas are leading us into a new era of global development that can be seen 
as constituting a fourth industrial revolution.1 But it is to say that there are 
challenges accumulating which, if left unattended, could chip away to varying 
degrees at the Internet’s enormous capacity to facilitate human progress.  
 
We need to take stock of these challenges, and to begin a more structured 
dialogue about their nature, scope and distributed collective management. No 
centralized or global intergovernmental response is possible or desirable, 
given the decentralized character of the Internet that is one of its chief virtues. 
Effective solutions can only be found through inclusive multistakeholder 
dialogue and cooperation that is informed by shared understandings of the 
challenges and the stakes. 
 
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to contribute to the emergence of a 
common baseline understanding of Internet fragmentation. We map the 
landscape of some of the key trends and practices that have been variously 
described as constituting Internet fragmentation and highlight 28 examples. 
We distinguish between cases of technical, governmental and commercial 
fragmentation. The technical cases generally can be said to involve 
fragmentation “of” the Internet, or its underlying physical and logical 
infrastructures. The governmental and commercial cases often more directly 
involve fragmentation “on” the Internet, or the transactions and cyberspace it 
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conveys, although they also can involve the infrastructure as well. With the 
examples cited placed in these three conjoined baskets, we can get a holistic 
overview of their nature and scope and more readily engage in the sort of 
dialogue and cooperation that is needed. 
 
It should be noted that while the authors all have strongly held views about 
the importance of promoting a secure, stable and integrated Internet 
consistent with the values of open economies and societies as well as 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, this paper is not intended to argue a 
strong authorial viewpoint or to offer policy recommendations. Instead, our 
modest objective is to facilitate discussion among World Economic Forum 
participants and others in the global community that may have varying 
viewpoints in the hope that they will work towards the identification of shared 
priorities and responses. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1, The Nature of Internet 
Fragmentation, sets out our approach to the subject. Section 2, Technical 
Fragmentation, surveys actual or potential sites of fragmentation in the 
underlying technological environment that can affect the Internet’s functioning. 
Section 3, Governmental Fragmentation, considers the evolving tensions 
between the territorial sovereign state and the transnational Internet and how 
these have translated into a complex interplay between fragmentation and 
harmonization in national policies. Section 4, Commercial Fragmentation, 
turns to the controversies around certain industry practices that some actors 
view as constituting forms of fragmentation. Finally, Section 5, Conclusions, 
pulls back from the issue survey to offer some observations and options for 
further work. 
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1. The Nature of Internet Fragmentation 
 
We begin our inquiry by proceeding in three steps. First, we consider the 
baseline from which fragmentation is a departure – the open global public 
Internet. Second, we suggest “working definitions” of technical, governmental 
and commercial fragmentation that we believe are sufficient to facilitate 
structured and productive conversation. Finally, we take note of some of the 
ways in which instances of fragmentation vary from one another, sometimes 
considerably.  
 
The Open Internet 
 
A useful starting point is to consider what we mean by an unfragmented 
Internet. What is the baseline from which fragmentation departs and against 
which it can be assessed? 
 
From a technical standpoint, the original shared vision guiding the Internet’s 
development was that every device on the Internet should be able to 
exchange data packets with any other device that was willing to receive them. 
Universal connectivity among the willing was the default assumption, and it 
could be achieved across a network of interconnected networks if the 
equipment designed by different providers built in interoperability. This means 
the ability to transfer and make usable data between systems and 
applications, and it is achieved via the deployment of common technical 
standards and protocols.2 
 
Such interoperability needs to be to be seamlessly coherent on an end-to-end 
basis. It also needs to be consistent, so that a user’s action yields the same 
response irrespective of the location or service provider involved. Hence, as 
one leading expert has concluded, from an engineering standpoint, 
“Fragmentation … encompasses the appearance of diverse pressures in the 
networked environment that lead to diverse outcomes that are no longer 
coherent or consistent.”3 
 
These core features of universal connectivity and interoperability between 
consenting devices, and the same action yielding the same result each time, 
are fundamental from a design standpoint. Actions or conditions that impair 
this seamless functioning can thus be said constitute technical fragmentation. 
But at the same time, this narrow technical definition may be a bit limiting. It 
does not by itself capture how people use and experience the technology in 
order to construct digital social formations and engage in information, 
communication and commercial transactions, or the sorts of political and 
economic forces that may impede their abilities to do so. In this context, it is 
useful to recast the notion of an unfragmented Internet in terms of the “open” 
Internet. 
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But what is an open Internet? Here again we can step into a lacuna regarding 
a foundational and valued principle of Internet discourse, design and policy. 
Over the years, the term “openness” has been paired with many core 
elements of the information and communication technology environment – 
open access, open source, open standards, open architecture, open network, 
open decision processes, and so on – but sometimes fine grained differences 
of perspective impede the formation of consensus on clear shared meanings. 
Often people simply answer the question by listing properties of the Internet 
that they find desirable, although admittedly this is not necessarily the most 
systematic or neutral approach. A human rights lawyer, a trade economist 
and a network engineer might each give the term a special shade of meaning 
based on their respective priorities and experiences.  
 
We cannot attempt to delve deeply into this long-standing question in this 
paper. For present purposes, it is sufficient to fall back on the approach of 
listing properties that seem from our vantage points to be integral to a robust 
conception of “openness“. In its document on “Internet invariants”, the Internet 
Society has offered a list that is an attractive baseline and is worth quoting at 
length, in Box 1. 
 
Box 1: The Internet Society’s “Internet Invariants” 
 
Global reach, integrity: Any endpoint of the Internet can 
address any other endpoint, and the information received at 
one endpoint is as intended by the sender, wherever the 
receiver connects to the Internet. Implicit in this is the 
requirement of global, managed addressing and naming 
services.   
 
General purpose: The Internet is capable of supporting a 
wide range of demands for its use. While some networks 
within it may be optimized for certain traffic patterns or 
expected uses, the technology does not place inherent 
limitations on the applications or services that make use of it.  
 
Supports innovation without requiring permission (by 
anyone): Any person or organization can set up a new 
service, that abides by the existing standards and best 
practices, and make it available to the rest of the Internet, 
without requiring special permission. The best example of 
this is the World Wide Web – which was created by a 
researcher in Switzerland, who made his software available 
for others to run, and the rest, as they say, is history. Or, 
consider Facebook – if there was a business approval board 
for new Internet services, would it have correctly assessed 
Facebook’s potential and given it a green light? 
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Accessible – it’s possible to connect to it, build new parts of 
it and study it overall: Anyone can “get on” the Internet – not 
just to consume content from others, but also to contribute 
content on existing services, put up a server (Internet node) 
and attach new networks. 
 
Based on interoperability and mutual agreement: The key to 
enabling inter-networking is to define the context for 
interoperation – through open standards for the 
technologies, and mutual agreements between operators of 
autonomous pieces of the Internet. 
 
Collaboration: Overall, a spirit of collaboration is required – 
beyond the initial basis of interoperation and bi-lateral 
agreements, the best solutions to new issues that arise stem 
from willing collaboration between stakeholders. These are 
sometimes competitive business interests, and sometimes 
different stakeholders altogether (e.g. technology and 
policy). 
 
Technology – reusable building blocks: Technologies have 
been built and deployed on the Internet for one purpose, 
only to be used at a later date to support some other 
important function. This isn’t possible with vertically 
integrated, closed solutions. And, operational restrictions on 
the generalized functionality of technologies as originally 
designed have an impact on their viability as building blocks 
for future solutions.  
 
There are no permanent favourites: While some 
technologies, companies and regions have flourished, their 
continued success depends on continued relevance and 
utility, not strictly some favoured status. AltaVista emerged 
as the pre-eminent search service in the 1990’s, but has 
long-since been forgotten. Good ideas are overtaken by 
better ideas; to hold on to one technology or remove 
competition from operators is to stand in the way of the 
Internet’s natural evolution.4 
 
 
These are all essential aspects of the open Internet environment, and a 
number of them speak directly to what fragmentation in a broader user-
oriented and socio-politically attuned sense of the word entails. Of particular 
interest here are the notions of global reach with integrity; a unified, global 
and properly governed root and naming/numbering system; interoperability; 
universal accessibility; the reusability of capabilities; and permissionless 
innovation. An Internet in which any endpoint could not address any other 
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willing endpoint and have reliably consistent results; and in which digital 
resources could not be redeployed to an endless variety of user-defined 
purposes, including the creation of new applications and services, without 
needing the permission of an intervening authority – this would be a rather 
fragmented Internet. It would be one that is robbed of what one leading expert 
calls “generativity”, or the “system's capacity to produce unanticipated change 
through unfiltered contributions from broad and varied audiences”.5 An open 
Internet allows creative users to draw on common resources and add to, 
recombine and customize them in order to design global e-commerce 
processes and organize value chains, mobilize human rights campaigns, 
create new products, or socially network with fellow cute cat lovers. 
Constraints on such usage, in the form of government policies and 
commercial practices, can cause fragmentation just as much as a technical 
misfire resulting in inconsistent results. 
 
Working Definitions 
 
Putting users and their freedoms at the centre of the discussion implies the 
need for an optic that is wider than just whether the infrastructure effectively 
connects willing devices anywhere and functions consistently each time at 
each end. The standard engineering description of the Internet is as a four 
layered stack of functionalities. The lowest is the physical or hardware link 
layer over which packets are carried, such as Ethernet, Wireless Wi-Fi, 
dedicated optical telecommunications circuits, or satellite links. Moving up the 
stack, the network or Internet layer is where the Internet protocol (IP) carries 
packets from a source to a destination, using the routing protocols to 
determine the paths taken by the packets. Moving further up, the transport 
layer comprises protocols for various kinds of data transport, such as 
sequenced and assure delivery of data using the Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP), or the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) for real-time but not 
necessarily sequenced or guaranteed delivery. Each IP packet carries an 
indication of which protocol is to be used to handle the contents or payload of 
each Internet packet. Finally, at the top one finds the applications layer where 
utility protocols such as File Transport Protocol (FTP), Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol (HTTP), Simple Mail Transport Protocol (SMTP), and many others 
reside.  
 
Social analysts often add on top of these four technology layers what they 
variously call a content, social, or transactional layer to capture the 
substantive information exchanged and the interactions and behaviours 
involved.6 In discussing how the Internet is actually used and how that usage 
may be impeded, the addition of this fifth nominal layer is helpful. The concept 
could be seen as very roughly analogous to the distinction in traditional 
telecommunications between network carriage and its content (although in the 
Internet’s case this is actually too binary a parallel for reasons that need not 
detain us). Accordingly, in this study we shall refer to a fifth “content and 
transactions” layer; the resulting scheme is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Internet Layers 
 
5. Content and Transactions Layer 
4. Application Layer 
3. Transport Layer  
2. Network/IP Layer 
1. Physical/Link Layer 
 
 
This sort of distinction between the underlying physical and software-enabled 
logical infrastructure and its utilization was central to the working definition of 
Internet governance that was agreed to by the United Nations Working Group 
on Internet Governance in 2005. Two of the authors of this paper were in that 
group and were centrally involved in developing the definition: “Internet 
governance is the development and application by Governments, the private 
sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, 
rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution 
and use of the Internet.”7 By distinguishing between the infrastructure and the 
and its utilization and saying that governance occurs at both these broadly 
construed levels, the definition facilitated a clearer and ultimately more 
productive debate among governments and stakeholders in the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS) and helped to shape the next decade of 
dialogue and action on global Internet governance.8  
 
A closely related bit of nomenclature that was used at the time and has since 
taken its place in the lexicon was the distinction between governance “of” the 
Internet and governance “on” the Internet. This simple binary is actually a bit 
misleading and problematic insofar as processes and governance issues may 
extend across it. Moreover, it has lent itself to some unduly strategic 
discussions in which certain actors argued that e.g. rules and procedures 
pertaining to the “of” half of the binary are purely administrative and should be 
left out of discussions of “governance”.9 But as a simplifying heuristic device it 
also has proven useful in helping to ease discussions, so we adopt the 
convention here.  
 
In the pages to follow, we discuss three forms of fragmentation: 
 
Ø Technical fragmentation: conditions in the underlying infrastructure that 
impede the ability of systems to fully interoperate and exchange data 
packets and of the Internet to function consistently at all end points. These 
generally pertain to layers 1-4 of the model above. 
 
Ø Governmental fragmentation: Government policies and actions that 
constrain or prevent certain uses of the Internet to create, distribute, or 
access information resources. These generally are targeted at the 5th 
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layer in our model, but they may involve actions taken at the lower 
technical layers as well. 
 
Ø Commercial fragmentation: Business practices that constrain or prevent 
certain uses of the Internet to create, distribute or access information 
resources. These generally are targeted at the 5th layer in our model, but 
they may involve actions taken at the lower technical layers as well. 
 
We should note that some other observers refer to social or cultural forms of 
fragmentation. In this paper we do not treat the existence of different cultures, 
languages, social preferences, and so on as sources of fragmentation. They 
are simply sources of difference. They may be relevant if, for example, 
cultural sensibilities lead a government to undertake an action that is 
fragmentary, but we do not view them as independently causal of 
fragmentation. In addition, in addressing the roles of governments, we do not 
attempt to separately delve into what some call “legal fragmentation” due to 
the existence of different national legal systems.10 The arguments for or 
against treating legal differences in this manner are best left to those in the 
legal profession. 
 
Again, ours are working definitions proposed to facilitate discussion, and they 
may be fine-tuned or thoroughly rethought as the emerging dialogue on 
fragmentation unfolds. But for now they seem to approximately meet some 
key criteria for such definitions. These include: adequacy, or being “good 
enough’ to capture the main meanings that seem to be in play when people 
discuss fragmentation; generalizability, or applicability across a broad range 
of current and potential conditions; conciseness, in that they do not appear to 
include nonessential terminological verbiage; and neutrality, in that they are 
not intrinsically normative.  
 
It should be emphasized that while in the pages to follow we discuss the three 
types sequentially on a stand-alone basis, this is a convenience intended to 
reduce narrative complexity. In many cases, the driving considerations at 
work pertain to the content accessed and transactions undertaken by users, 
rather than by a desire to alter the infrastructure per se. For example, 
governments typically are focused on what happens at the top 5th layer of 
content and transactions rather than on how the lower layers operate. Even 
so, the pursuit of remedies to perceived problems in Internet usage often 
does lead them to take actions that directly or indirectly impact the underlying 
infrastructure. In some cases, the same may be said of commercial 
fragmentation. Here as elsewhere, the nominal boundary between 
fragmentation “of” and fragmentation “on” the Internet can be blurred. 
 
The Variability of Fragmentation 
 
As our trichotomy of technical, governmental and commercial fragmentation 
indicates, fragmentation is not singular in its sources or forms. But the 
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complexity of the matter does not end there. Within and across the three 
categories there can be a great deal of variation in its character. Indeed, one 
could devise a long list of attributes according to which any given instance of 
fragmentation may vary. To make the discussion more manageable, we 
highlight just four dimensions of variation that are applicable to our categories 
and the universe of examples we present in subsequent sections of the 
paper. 
 
Occurrence 
 
The first and most fundamental consideration is whether a given form of 
fragmentation exists. This is not an entirely straightforward question; 
fragmentation is not always a simple binary condition that is either present or 
not present. There can be gradations with different values along a continuum. 
In some cases those values can be precisely quantified (e.g. the number of 
websites or other information resources to which access is fully blocked), but 
in others the best we can do is to devise ordinal measures.  
 
Similarly, there can be variations in duration. Fragmentation may be a short-
term phenomenon that is rectified fairly quickly, as with recovery from some 
disabling cyberattacks, or it can be sustained as a long-term condition. In time 
sensitive situations, even short-term fragmentation can be very damaging to 
users or transactions. In general though, presumably we should be most 
concerned with sustained fragmentation with recursive consequences. 
 
A final issue here is that fragmentation does not need to be currently present 
to be of concern. That is, in many of the instances that people cite when 
worrying about the matter and that we discuss in the sections to follow, what 
is at stake is the emergence of tendencies and pressures that could give rise 
to something significant in the future. As in any policy arena, we need not wait 
for a problem to become full blown and wreaking havoc for awareness and 
action to be well advised. 
 
Intentionality 
 
Fragmentation may be the unintended by-product of decisions and actions 
guided by unrelated objectives. A number of instances of technical 
fragmentation are of this character. People who deploy or fail to deploy a 
particular technology in addressing a localized operational challenge may not 
be setting out to fragment the Internet. Nevertheless, their actions, especially 
if replicated by others, could come to have broader effects. Divergences 
between individually rational choices and systemically suboptimal 
consequences are a standard feature of collective actions problems generally 
and the same logic can apply to the openness or fragmentation of the 
Internet. 
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Alternatively, fragmentation may be intentional. The character of these 
intentions obviously matters quite a bit. On the one hand, organizations, 
communities and individuals may seek to separate themselves somewhat 
from the open public Internet for entirely defensible reasons. Installing a 
firewall to limit access and communication to only authorized and consenting 
parties and to protect resources from unwanted interference is a benign act of 
self-separation. On the other hand, actors such as some governments may 
seek to shape, constrain or fully block the activity of others who have not 
consented to this. Imposing limitations on others is a malign act of forced 
separation. Both unintentional and intentional fragmentation can be 
problematic, but the best approach to remediation may vary accordingly. In 
some cases awareness raising, dialogue and coordination may be sufficient, 
but in others negotiations and even the application of pressure may be called 
for. 
 
Impact 
 
Fragmentation may be deep, structural and configurative of large swaths of 
activity or even the Internet as a whole. Consider, for example, the 
implications if significant categories of data flows were to be widely blocked 
around the world, or if an alternative root system with its own address and 
name space were to be established with the backing of powerful governments 
or organizations. The scope of the processes, transactions and actors 
impacted by such breakage would be substantial. But fragmentation also can 
be more shallow, malleable and applicable to a narrowly bounded set of 
processes, transactions and actors. The impact could be significant for some 
people but go unnoticed by others. 
 
As with the other dimensions just mentioned, it can be difficult to measure the 
intensity of fragmentation and say with certainty exactly where on the 
continuum a given instance lays. Even so, in considering examples, we 
should be mindful that fragmentations are not all created equal in terms of 
magnitude and import. Indeed, a number of the examples we discuss are 
relatively low-impact or low-intensity matters – bothersome and concerning 
enough to engineers and operators that attention to them is merited, but not 
so significant that they endanger the fundamental integrity, openness and 
utility of the Internet. In contrast, some other examples we cover are higher-
impact and arguably in need of concerted responses. 
 
Character 
 
Finally, irrespective of the strength of impact, duration, and so on, 
fragmentation also can vary along a continuum of, for lack of better words, 
“good” to “bad”. This is an admittedly squishy and difficult to measure 
attribute, but it captures something important because the tenor of the debate 
could easily lead one to believe that fragmentation is always and everywhere 
a bad thing. But of course, organizations, communities and individuals choose 
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all the time not to be perfectly reachable from all other end points. The 
widespread prevalence of firewalls, encryption and other security and privacy 
tools that allow users to carefully mediate their boundaries and decide which 
data they welcome to flow across these indicates that fragmentation also can 
be benevolent and valued. 
 
Of course, whether something is viewed as good or bad can depend on 
norms and value judgments; a human rights defender may regard the dark 
web as a relatively safe place to communicate and thus a good sort of 
fragmentation, while a law enforcement or intelligence person may regard it 
differently.   
 
Indeed, people can even have different views about whether significant, 
structural fragmentation is necessarily a bad thing. Most notably, Columbia 
University economist Eli Noam has elicited much debate with a short but 
suggestive broadside against those who argue that fragmentation is 
inherently bad; see the selection in Box 2.  
 
Box 2: A Contrarian View 
 
Instead of mourning about the passing of uniformity, we should 
embrace the emergence of diversity. We must get used to the idea 
that the standardized Internet is the past but not the future. And that 
the future is a federated Internet, not a uniform one. I used to think 
that this was regrettable but unavoidable. Even that upsets many 
people: how can one doubt the integrity of the one Internet that has 
served us so well? Now, I want to go one step further to argue that it 
is not regrettable at all. It is actually a good thing. The single Internet 
was a good system in the past but not in the future …. 
 
A technical centrifugalism is inevitable. It is especially inevitable if it 
becomes readily possible to interoperate among different Internet 
flavours. To provide such interoperability across non-uniform 
protocols are intermediaries that supply ‘bridging as a service’. 
These intermediaries are likely to be some of the emerging cloud 
computing providers … Most will be private, but some will be public 
and governmental. The ITU [International Telecommunication 
Union], too, could initiate such a cloud …. 
 
The emergence of such a system of interconnected private Internet 
arrangements does not negate a public Internet. On the contrary, 
the two arrangements supplement each other. If private Internet 
arrangements are too restrictive, costly or discriminatory, the public 
system provides a safety valve, and vice versa. This will prevent 
such a system from becoming a walled garden of walled gardens, 
which would be unacceptable.11 
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This is, to be sure, a controversial view. But it raises a range of interesting 
questions about the overall evolution of the Internet as it becomes ever more 
ubiquitous and embedded in complex and diverse social orders; under what 
conditions might which forms of fragmentation be benevolent or pernicious; 
whether fragmentation is sometimes an inevitability to be managed and 
adapted to as best we can or is instead always a function of short-sighted 
decisions that should be questioned and remediated; and so on. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section we have sketched out our general analytical orientation to the 
problem of Internet fragmentation and proposed for working purposes three 
basic definitions that cover the universe of current and potential cases we 
have considered. In the next three sections we map out that universe.  
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2. Technical Fragmentation  
 
When the Internet concept was first articulated, a guiding vision was that 
every device on the Internet should be able to exchange packets with any 
other device. Universal connectivity was assumed to be a primary benefit. 
One could not know when such connectivity might prove useful and to 
exclude any seemed self-defeating. It was further assumed, however, that no 
device could or should be compelled to engage in communication and that a 
recipient of a packet could reject or ignore it or impose certain requirements 
on any further communication.  
 
There are a variety of ways in which the original concept of a fully connected 
Internet has been eroded over the course of the Internet’s over 30 years of 
operation. Technical fragmentation of the underlying physical and logical 
infrastructure is a complex evolutionary process that has unfolded slowly but 
is gathering pockets of steam in the contemporary era. Some of it has been 
intentional and motivated by operational and other concerns, and some of it 
has been the unintended by-product of actions taken with other objective in 
mind. Moreover, the means by which such fragmentation has been achieved 
also varies in technical terms. To capture these realities, in this section we 
survey some key trends with respect to addressing, interconnection, naming 
and security in the Internet. 
 
Addressing  
 
The original design of the Internet used 32 bit numerical identifiers, analogous 
to telephone numbers, to designate end points on the Internet. Unlike the 
telephone numbering plan, however, IP addresses were not nationally-based. 
Their structure was related to the way in which the networks of the Internet 
were connected. Each network was made up of a collection of IP addresses 
associated with an autonomous system number. An endpoint on a given 
autonomous system or network could be anywhere on the globe, but 
endpoints of a particular autonomous system are all interconnected through 
that network.  
 
The IP suite went through four major design iterations and the final form for 
the IP addressing was called IPv4. The 32 bit addresses were represented as 
four decimal values separated by periods such as 27.2.18.155. Each field has 
a value ranging from 0 to 255 (i.e. values that can be expressed in eight 
binary bits). This address format allowed for up to 4.3 billion possible 
terminations on the Internet. This so-called dotted notation does not reflect 
any hierarchical structure – it is merely a convenient way to express a 32 bit 
number.  
 
Coordination of the numbering system is one of the Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) functions. The Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) currently performs the IANA functions, on 
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behalf of the US government, through a contract with the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration.12 ICANN allocates 
blocks of numbers to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which are 
non-profit corporations that administer and register the IP address space 
numbers within their regions.13 The global multistakeholder community is 
currently hard at work on a plan to transition the US government’s 
stewardship of the IANA functions to a newly independent and accountable 
ICANN, hopefully in 2016. 
 
As the Internet was deployed commercially, it became apparent that there 
might not be enough numbers to serve all the possible terminations on the 
growing Internet. This realization triggered two developments. The first was 
the creation of private numbering plans that allowed for local use of IP 
addresses that could not be routed through the public Internet. Three distinct 
private address spaces allowed for networks of up to 256 devices, 32,384 and 
16 million devices respectively. In order to allow local devices to communicate 
with other devices on the public Internet, these private addresses have to be 
translated into addresses that are routable in the public Internet. This is the 
second development associated with IP address limitations.  
 
The process is called Network Address Translation (NAT) and it has become 
widely used to allow many local devices to share a single, public IP address. 
There is economic incentive for Internet service providers (ISPs) to implement 
this mechanism so as to maximize the number of subscribers whose devices 
can be serviced. This process introduces the possibility of a kind of 
fragmentation in the Internet because the private addresses are isolated from 
the rest of the Internet unless they pass through a so-called NAT box (that 
could be part of a router). In some cases, this isolation may, in fact, be an 
attractive feature of the NAT mechanism, in addition to the fact that a 
subscriber who is using private IP addresses does not have to renumber all 
his or her devices when changing to a new ISP since the NAT process takes 
care of the mapping into publicly routable addresses when needed.  
 
Recognizing the potential depletion of the IPv4 address space, the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) that develops international standards for the 
Internet introduced a new address format called IPv6. This packet format 
allows for a 128 bit address space, sufficient to label 340 trillion trillion trillion 
endpoints in the public Internet. The expansion of address space comes with 
a price, however, because the two formats, IPv4 and IPv6, are not 
compatible. It is necessary to run the IPs in parallel in what is called dual-
stack mode.  
 
At present, only about 4% of the Internet is servicing IPv6 usage. There have 
been signs of late of growing momentum in IPv6 adoption, but clearly there is 
still a long way to go.14 To make matters worse, most of the RIRs that assign 
IP address space to ISPs and other end users have essentially exhausted 
their supplies of IPv4 addresses and have only IPv6 address space to assign. 
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A market for IPv4 address space has developed but this can only postpone 
the inevitable need for more addresses. Even the use of NAT will not really 
prove adequate to serve the enormous anticipated needs of the Internet of 
Things. In addition, new computer chipsets and cloud computing 
environments allow for many virtual machines to operate on a single chip, 
leading to the need for multiple addresses to distinguish among the virtual 
systems.  
 
The fragmentation risk is that the transition to IPv6 will continue to lag and 
result in IPv4 and IPv6 Internets that do not interwork. ISPs are being 
encouraged to implement both IPv4 and IPv6 services and end device 
makers are being encouraged to implement dual-stack IPv4 and IPv6. It 
remains to be seen whether these remedies will keep the Internet fully 
connected, with IPv6 being the eventual address format of choice in the 
longer term.  
 
There are other special addresses ranges for multicasting, that is, sending 
packets to more than one recipient at a time. One variation on this is the so-
called Anycast mechanism that allows computers in many physical locations 
in the Internet to receive traffic destined for a particular address and respond 
to it. This is in use in the Domain Name System (DNS), discussed below.  
 
Interconnecting the Network of Networks 
 
The routing of traffic in the Internet is accomplished by means of routing 
protocols used by routers to share information about the topology of the 
connections among the myriad networks that make up the Internet. An 
autonomous system is a set of networks and routers that form a connected 
whole. The Internet is made up of many such autonomous systems. The 
routers of any particular system use one of several possible interior gateway 
protocols to establish the connectivity of the system. Each router within an 
autonomous system maintains a table of information that allows it to 
determine the next hop for a packet in a path through the routers of the 
system until it reaches its destination in that system or arrives at what is 
called a border router or gateway to the next autonomous system along the 
packet’s path to the ultimate destination.  
 
The topology of the global network of autonomous systems (i.e. the Internet) 
is maintained through the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) that allows the 
ensemble of border routers to determine how to route packets. There is a 
good deal of trust involved in this system and it is possible to inject false 
information into the routing system to cause packets to flow along paths not 
expected by the originator. Each autonomous system’s border routers 
announce the Internet addresses that can be reached within that system and 
the BGP protocol allows all the border routers to form a global routing table. 
Although a good deal of attention is paid by the operators of the networks of 
the Internet to the possibility that false or incorrect information may be 
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inserted into the global routing table, it is still technically possible for 
deliberate or accidental corruption of the routing data to occur. Traffic can be 
routed into so-called black holes, for example, or along paths that allow 
surveillance. Technical means have been proposed to defend against such 
occurrences but they have not yet matured into use.  
 
The operators of networks of the Internet determine on their own with which 
other networks they will interconnect and on what terms and conditions. There 
are several forms of interconnection. One form is called peering, in which a 
pair of networks connect directly with each other or through an Internet 
Exchange Point (IXP). It is typical that network peering is settlement free in 
the sense that the parties do not charge each other for carrying traffic, having 
concluded that they are receiving comparable value as a consequence of the 
mutual carriage. In a peering relationship, each ISP carries the other’s traffic 
but only to subscribers of the carrying ISP, not to the ISP’s other peers.  
 
There is a second alternative connection method called transit in which one 
network pays the other to carry its traffic into the rest of the Internet. This is a 
typical outcome when a smaller ISP chooses to pay for service to all points of 
the Internet rather than building additional resources to establish sufficient 
peering connections to reach all of the Internet. The transit ISP delivers the 
received traffic to its customers and to all its peers. In practice, many ISPs 
make use of both methods. There is also a hybrid form of interconnection 
called paid peering in which the operators agree to carry each other’s traffic to 
their respective customers but one ISP pays the other.  
 
To date the system of private interconnection contracts among ISPs has 
ensured the provision of an integrated global public Internet. It is important to 
ensure that this is preserved even if the incentives to some operators begin to 
change in ways that could lead to increased costs and fragmentation; we 
return to this question in Section 4 of this paper. 
 
As the Internet became a commercial service and was adopted by the private 
sector, legitimate interest in protecting computing assets from access by the 
“outside world” led to the design and implementation of firewalls that could 
filter traffic at the packet level. Certain protocols could be blocked, port 
numbers filtered, and even certain source or destination IP address ranges 
might be allowed or disallowed. This kind of filtering can be implemented in 
routers and in edge devices including personal computers. As the Internet of 
Things (IoT) becomes more prominent, considerable attention may be paid to 
white listing and strong authentication to protect devices, their controls and 
their information from unauthorized access.  
 
Experience with firewalls has shown them to be insufficient for protection. 
One can physically walk past a firewall, bringing an infected laptop or memory 
stick into an enterprise and spread viruses and worms among the computers 
that are part of the internal enterprise network. Firewalls are, however, a 
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useful complement to other methods of protection. It seems fair to say that 
this is a positive form of fragmentation intended to protect enterprise or 
personal resources from unwanted connections.  
 
The IPs allow for a virtual private network (VPN) service in which an ISP 
allows a customer to tunnel through its part of the Internet to a destination 
network. The VPN customer receives an IP address that makes it look as if it 
is part of the destination network connected through a typically encrypted 
tunnel through a part of the public Internet. Users of VPNs isolate themselves 
from the global Internet and behave as if they are part of the target network. 
Corporations with private networks connected to the Internet often use VPN 
tunnelling to support their employees who need to access corporate assets 
without exposing these to connection by general users of the Internet. It might 
be argued that this capability represents a form of fragmentation. What is 
perhaps more of concern is that some national jurisdictions are blocking the 
use of the VPN protocols to prevent users from protecting their traffic from 
surveillance. In actual fact, VPNs are losing some favour since a 
compromised laptop or desktop computer with a VPN connection to a 
corporate network may become the avenue for reaching the assets of the 
corporate network. Other means of end/end encryption and authentication are 
gaining favour. 
 
In a variation on the VPN, there is the so-called TOR network or “onion 
space” that allows users to route traffic randomly through a network of 
forwarding nodes partly to obscure the originator of the traffic and to obscure 
the intended destination of the traffic to surveillance until it reaches its last 
hop. Typically, the traffic is encrypted for privacy until it reaches its 
destination. Ironically, TOR was originally developed by the US Naval 
Research Laboratory for use by the intelligence community for exfiltration of 
information and was later made openly available. It is widely employed by 
human rights activists and others with legitimate reasons to avoid government 
surveillance. But it also is the home of a “dark web” of illegal activities and 
thus poses challenges to law enforcement and intelligence operations.15 This 
well illustrates the double-edged sword of the technologies of the Internet. 
 
The Domain Name System  
 
 For flexibility, the protocols above the TCP/IP layer make use of domain 
names rather than numerical IP addresses to refer to sources and sinks of 
Internet traffic. Example.com is a domain name whose top-level domain is 
“com” and whose second-level domain is “example”. Domain names are 
essentially synonymous with the notion of a logical end point on the Internet: 
a client, server or edge computing device of some kind. Before higher-level 
protocols can make use of the lower-level protocols such as TCP or UDP, 
they must use the DNS to translate from the domain name form to a 
numerical IP address form. These applications perform a domain name 
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lookup using a system of resolvers and name servers that form the 
hierarchical DNS.  
 
The top-level information of the DNS is called the root zone and it points to 
the name servers for the top-level domains (TLDs) of the Internet, of which 
there are now on the order of 1,200. They include the familiar “.com”, “.net” 
and “.org” and country codes such as “.us”, “.fr” and “.jp” and now hundreds of 
new top-level domains including “.restaurant”, “.pharmacy” and “.capetown”.16 
In addition to being easier to remember, domain names have the property that 
then can be translated into one or more IP addresses, and those addresses 
can be changed without changing the domain name. This means that 
persistent references can be made to a destination domain name even if the 
IP address of the destination in the Internet changes. If a website chooses to 
locate a server at a new IP address, it does not have to change its domain 
name. Rather, the name server for that domain name only has to respond 
with a new IP address when the name lookup occurs.  
 
Originally there were only 13 root servers on the Internet that pointed to the 
TLD name servers but since that time, using the Anycast routing system, 
hundreds of root servers populate the Internet today.  
 
In the beginning, domain names were expressed in Latin characters, letters 
A-Z, digits 0-9 and the hyphen. Upper and lower case was ignored for 
purposes of looking up domain names and translating them into IP addresses. 
As the Internet expansion continued, it was recognized that a broader range 
of scripts were needed to allow expression of domain names in Cyrillic, 
Greek, Chinese, Korean, Hebrew, Hindi, Urdu and many other languages. 
The IETF developed new standards for incorporating the Unicode character 
set into the DNS so that domain names could be expressed in many different 
scripts. Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) could lead to some forms of 
fragmentation, depending on how uniformly the processing of domain names 
is done across the Internet. Depending on the software used, there can be 
variations and failures to successfully look up domain names in the so-called 
IDN format. Efforts continue to implement this processing in a uniform fashion 
to minimize unintended fragmentation of the system.  
 
In its original formulation circa 1984, the DNS used a handful of generic top-
level domain names (gTLD): .com, .net, .org, .edu, .gov, .mil and .int. A 
special TLD included .arpa to assist in a transition from the original ARPANET 
naming scheme to the DNS. Subsequently, two-letter codes created by the 
United Nations Statistics organization for countries and areas of economic 
interest were adopted as country code top-level domain names (ccTLD). 
There were on the order of 200 such codes, such as .us, .fr, .tk, .jp, .za, .ar 
(United States, France, Turkey, Japan, South Africa and Argentina, 
respectively).  
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ICANN added additional gTLDs between 2000 and 2011, and in 2012 
launched the new gTLD Programme. In the first round of the programme it 
received 1,930 applications, and as of December 2015, it had approved and 
delegated 853 of these into the root zone file. Another 480 applications are 
proceeding through the process, 560 have been withdrawn, and 37 have not 
been approved or are otherwise not proceeding.17 The expansion of the TLD 
space provides a broad range of choices for users to register second-level 
domain names such as abc.xyz and opens up many new opportunities for 
commerce, speech and community building. But it does raise an exceptionally 
wide range of issues that stakeholders and governments have laboured 
intensively to sort out, and among these involve new possibilities for 
fragmentation. 
 
A commonly heard criticism of the program that is sometimes framed in these 
terms has been that proliferation will lead to user uncertainty as to which 
domain names are authoritatively associated with which organizations or 
company brands. It also raises questions about in which TLDs a corporation 
should register to avoid such confusion. To make matters more complex, 
trademarks can belong to more than one organization while domain names 
must be unique. Which Berlin is associated with .berlin? Is apple.com the 
same company as apple.coop? Users may end up at destinations that are not 
the ones they are expecting. Together with the spread of IDNs, this may 
increase the likelihood that users will rely on search engines rather than 
names to find the resources they seek, as well as the importance of finding 
ways to validate destinations. Probably people may disagree as to whether all 
this counts as a sort of experiential fragmentation or simply confusion amidst 
complexity. 
 
More clearly a matter of fragmentation is that there is a possibility that the 
proliferation of new gTLDs will lead to increased blocking within the DNS. 
Already in 2011, many governments greeted ICANN’s approval of the .xxx 
gTLD for pornography with announcements that they would simply block the 
entire domain. As more character strings are entered into the root zone file 
that some governments deem to be risky, sensitive, or contrary to their laws, 
more national blocking could ensue. Indeed, during the debates leading to the 
launch of the New gTLD Program, some governments and others argued for 
simply refusing approval to (some observers said censoring) certain strings 
on the grounds that widespread blocking was contrary to an open Internet and 
could even be technically destabilizing.  
 
The technical community generally has disagreed with the latter argument, 
although at least some eyebrows were raised in October 2015 by VeriSign’s 
quarterly filing with the US Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
company noted that, “In view of our role as the Root Zone Maintainer, and as 
a root server operator, we face increased risks should ICANN’s delegation of 
these new gTLDs, which represent unprecedented changes to the root zone 
in volume and frequency, cause security and stability problems within the 
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DNS and/or for parties who rely on the DNS. Such risks include potential 
instability of the DNS including potential fragmentation of the DNS should 
ICANN’s delegations create sufficient instability, and potential claims based 
on our role in the root zone provisioning and delegation process.”18 This legal 
prudence notwithstanding, it is unclear that instability will ensue, but there 
may be more gTLD blocking and hence more fragmentation in the DNS. 
 
Another concern relates to the interfaces and possible collisions between 
public and private names. The DNS design was intended to respond with the 
same information no matter where the lookup originated. This is an important 
uniformity principal that is worth preserving to achieve a level of uniformity in 
the behaviour of the global Internet. This principal has already been altered by 
the use of internal corporate name servers that resolve to addresses, e.g. 
inside a corporate network and which are not reachable from outside a 
corporate boundary. This is sometimes referred to as split-horizon DNS and is 
useful for protecting access of corporate resources from outside the 
corporation network. There are also cases in which a lookup produces 
different results depending on the source IP address of the lookup. For 
example, looking up Google.com may actually resolve to the IP address of 
Google.fr or Google.za depending on the source IP address of the DNS 
lookup. More generally, “What was a relatively uniform common public space 
is now being fenced into a number of realms, many of which are private.”19  
 
There is another form of fragmentation that arises in the context paid access 
to Wi-Fe services in hotels, restaurants, etc. The user wishing to use the Wi-
Fi service typically tries to open a web page somewhere on the Internet. The 
DNS lookup that follows is intercepted by the local router/resolver and a false 
response is returned that takes the user to a website that requests the user to 
log in or at least make a payment before access to the Internet will be 
permitted. For all practical purposes, the mechanics of this are like hijacking 
arbitrary domain names. One solution to this problem is the development of a 
protocol specific to the authorization and validation process for access to the 
local service rather than coercing the DNS lookup.  
 
Preservation of a common root zone and common TLD space across the 
Internet has been an important unifying principal. Assuring that the 
information returned from a DNS lookup has been a high priority for protocol 
development and a method for achieving this uses digital signatures to bind 
the domain name to its associated IP address(es). The so-called domain 
name system security extensions (DNSSEC) standard is designed to allow 
the responses to domain name lookups to be checked for integrity and 
rejected if digital signatures do not match the expectations of the party doing 
the lookup.  
 
DNSSEC is already in use in the Internet and, in particular, the root zone with 
its references to all top-level domains is being signed for integrity. This could 
allow any domain name resolver to cache a copy of the root zone and be 
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assured that the data has not been altered, and to reduce dependence on the 
existing system of Anycast root servers. We return below to DNSSEC and the 
use of cryptography. 
 
There is nothing in the Internet design that inhibits the creation of alternative 
ways to map identifiers into IP addresses. There have been experimental 
attempts to create alternate roots so as to allow users to choose different 
mappings of domain names to IP addresses or new identifiers spaces to be 
mapped into IP addresses. These generally have not succeeded, in part 
because they either required browser plug-ins to get to the right server or 
changes in the recursive resolvers to achieve the same objective. Alternate 
domain name roots create a prima facie hazard since the same names may 
map to different IP addresses and thus different servers. Users may land on a 
server that is only pretending to be the legitimate destination.  
 
A variation of this hazard has arisen in a current project called YETI that plans 
to import the root zone of the DNS that is managed by ICANN, strip the digital 
signature from the zone and re-sign with a YETI key.20 While its proponents 
assert that it is not intended to provide an alternate root, it does, in effect, do 
exactly that. Once in place, it is possible for local resolvers to be configured to 
refer to the YETI name server rather than to the ICANN servers and all entries 
in the YETI root zone would appear to be valid if the YETI signing key is 
accepted. Although its ostensible purpose is to explore limits to root server 
performance and functionality, it has to potential to introduce an alternate 
root.  
 
More generally, if ever leading governments or intergovernmental 
organizations were to implement an alternate root – a possibility that was 
sometimes raised in the highly charged geopolitical context of the WSIS 
negotiations – the results could be a game changer. Indeed, the 
establishment of an alternate root that has significant government backing 
arguably would be the mother of all fragmentations. 
 
There have been other identifier spaces developed that map into IP 
addresses such as the Digital Object Architecture developed by the 
Corporation for National Research Initiatives.21 Digital objects such as books, 
movies, music and other digitized content are assigned a unique and 
permanent identifier that can be looked up and mapped to an IP address 
where the object may be found. The importance of this work lies in the 
permanence of the identifier space. In the DNS, if domain name registrations 
are not renews, the domain names may no longer resolve and references to 
digital objects (e.g. web pages) using these domain names may no longer 
resolve.  
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Security 
 
For security and access control, it was thought in the original conception of 
the Internet that devices that wished to communicate only with known and 
authorized correspondents would make use of shared cryptographic keys as 
a means of validating legitimate correspondents. If the contents of received 
packets could be correctly decrypted, this was prima facie evidence that the 
sending party had legitimacy since the sharing of keys implied it. Of course, if 
a key has been obtained by stealth, bribery or cryptanalysis, this assumption 
would be incorrect. Although public key cryptography had been the subject of 
a spectacular 1976 IEEE article, at the time the early IPs were being defined 
in 1973-1978, this concept had not developed sufficiently for implementation 
to become part of the basic Internet security design.22 Since that time, public 
key cryptography has come into its own and is an important element for 
implementing confidentiality and authenticity in Internet-based exchanges.  
 
In fact, the notion of certificates and certificate authorities has evolved, using 
public key digital signatures, to allow correspondents to authenticate one 
another by confirming that a particular domain name, for example, is verifiably 
bound to a particular IP address or that a particular public key is verifiably 
associated with a particular domain name. The World Wide Web hypertext 
transfer protocol (HTTP) added a security feature to become HTTPS. Its use 
invoked an exchange resulting in a shared symmetric key for cryptography 
and could also involve certificated validation by either party of the other’s 
identity. 
 
A certificate authority can issue a certificate that typically associates a public 
cryptographic key with an identifier (e.g. a domain name). The certificate is 
signed with the private key of the certificate authority that matches the 
authority’s known public key. The recipient of the certificate can check the 
signature using the public key of the certificate authority. If it trusts the 
certificate authority and its signature, then it can use the public key in the 
certificate to authenticate the site associated with key.  
 
The IETF that develops technical standards for and implements the software 
and hardware mechanisms of the Internet develops various means to resist 
fragmentation. To prevent alteration of the DNS mapping of domain name to 
IP address, which would results in serious fragmentation, they have 
developed DNSSECs. In this system, the association of the domain name and 
its IP addresses is digitally signed in the records of the DNS. A signed lookup 
can be requested to assure that the information has not been undetectably 
altered since the holder of the domain name put it in place. DNSSEC reduces 
the risk of fragmentation by compromised domain name resolvers.23 With 
regard to routing, there also is a proposal that is not yet widely adopted and 
still needs technical refinement to protect the information distributed by the 
BGP from being corrupted by false announcements.  
 
 30 
Finally, the use of Certificate Authorities to authenticate the binding of domain 
names and public keys has been shown to be at risk either by penetration of a 
Certificate Authority by technical means leading to the production of false 
certificates or by corrupting a Certificate Authority to produce them. Assuming 
widespread use of DNSSEC in the DNS, a new proposal from the IETF called 
DANE would lodge public keys in the appropriate zone files of the DNS, 
limiting the ability for an abuser to produce corrupt certificates.  
 
In general, there is a trend towards the use of end-to-end cryptography to 
increase confidentiality and integrity of information exchanged through the 
Internet and the use of certificates and digital signatures to authenticate 
actors and the information they exchange. For example, a new proposal for 
protecting the privacy of domain name lookups is under consideration that 
would encrypt the domain name lookup itself. These practices are essential if 
widespread surveillance, deep packet inspection and other sources of privacy 
erosion are to be reduced.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section we have highlighted 12 kinds of technical fragmentation: 
 
1. Network Address Translation  
2. IPv4 and IPv6 incompatibility and the dual-stack requirement 
3. Routing corruption  
4. Firewall protections 
5. Virtual private network isolation and blocking  
6. TOR “onion space” and the “dark web”  
7. Internationalized Domain Name technical errors 
8. Blocking of new gTLDs 
9. Private name servers and the split-horizon DNS  
10. Segmented Wi-Fi services in hotels, restaurants, etc. 
11. Possibility of significant alternate DNS roots  
12. Certificate authorities producing false certificates  
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3. Governmental Fragmentation 
 
The most common imagery of “governmental fragmentation” is of the global 
public Internet being divided into so-called “Balkanized” or digitally bordered 
“national Internets”.24 Movement in the direction of national segmentation 
could entail, inter alia, establishing barriers that impede Internet technical 
functions, or block the flow of content and transactions over the infrastructure. 
Pressure and trends in this direction do exist. But so do counter-pressures 
and trends towards greater openness. Movement in this direction would give 
greater weight to global norms and values as embodied in international 
human rights law or trade agreements. The dialectical interaction of these 
forces of convergence and divergence varies across issues, space and time, 
so it can be difficult to judge where the pendulum may be at a given moment. 
But at least in some arenas, we clearly see more signs of fragmentation than 
we did just a few years ago. 
 
In this section we survey instances of fragmentation of and especially on the 
Internet that result from government action. After some brief historical context, 
we consider six clusters of issues: content and censorship; e-commerce and 
trade; national security; privacy and data protection; data localization; and 
fragmentation as an overarching national strategy. 
 
National Sovereignty and Cyberspace 
 
How to balance the demands for national sovereignty with transnational 
cyberspace has been debated since the start of the global commercial use of 
the Internet in the early 1990s.25 This was simply a new chapter in a long-
running story; since at least 1850, governments had devised a range of 
national policies and international regimes for communications and 
information in which the promotion of sovereign control over their segments of 
cross-border networks and information flows was a core foundational 
principle.26 Some governments and international organizations began to 
contemplate publicly whether there was a need for new governmental and 
intergovernmental mechanisms to strengthen the hands of sovereign states 
with respect to the Internet.  
 
Others were in favour of industry self-regulation and a “light touch” approach 
by governments. Within the United States, the Federal Communications 
Commission had differentiated between different classes of 
telecommunications and information services and treated the Internet as an 
unregulated application. The common view was that, “Limited government 
intervention is a major reason why the Internet has grown so rapidly in the 
US. The federal government’s efforts to avoid burdening the Internet with 
regulation should be looked upon as a major success and should be 
continued.”27 Hence, proposals were made for innovative forms of global 
multistakeholder governance or the market-friendly harmonization of national 
laws.  
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Moreover, an open, free and unfragmented Internet was seen as a universal 
value and enabler of economic growth and development worldwide. This was 
reflected, inter alia, in the “Global Information Infrastructure Initiative” that was 
proposed by US Vice-President Al Gore during the ITU’s World Conference 
on Telecommunication Development in Buenos Aires in 1995. The vision of a 
new borderless world, of a new economy and a new philosophy of industry 
self-regulation or at least public-private co-regulation became mainstream 
thinking in the 1990s, first in the United States and then across the 
industrialized world and beyond. 
 
All this promoted a popular imagination that on the eve of the 21st century 
there were now two interlinked but different worlds. On the one hand, there 
was the real world with an old economy and traditional borders, limited natural 
resources and classical business models. Here there were borders regulated 
by sovereign states on the basis of national interests. On the other hand, 
there was the virtual world with a new economy, borderless cyberspace, 
unlimited virtual resources (IP addresses, domain names), resources that can 
be reused (digital content), and innovative business models in which quantity, 
distance and duration did not play a role anymore. This was the borderless 
space managed by a multistakeholder community on the basis of universal 
values.28 Some analysts even speculated about the erosion of the 
international system of sovereign nation-states.  
 
But the nation-state system did not disappear. The over 3 billion Internet 
users live not in cyberspace, but rather in physical spaces overseen by 
governments with varying legal systems and policies. All virtual 
communication is enabled via physical servers that are located in concrete 
places and have to operate under the jurisdictions of host countries. And as 
governments began to adjust and embed the Internet into frameworks of 
public authority, patterns of policy-making took hold in a significant number of 
countries that entailed fragmenting selected domains of cyberspace. 
 
The 2002-2005 WSIS negotiations crystalized and clarified the emerging 
differences in preferences across countries. On Internet issues generally and 
Internet governance specifically, industrialized countries and some developing 
countries argued against top-down governmental controls and for preserving 
an open Internet subject to enabling rules. But many members of the Group of 
77 and China, as well as Russia and some former Soviet Bloc states, pushed 
for greatly expanded government controls, to be realized inter alia by 
replacing the US government’s special role viz. ICANN and the Internet’s root 
with an intergovernmental agency. These views ultimately did not prevail, and 
the agreements reached by governments generally struck a balance that 
supported a decentralized, multistakeholder and open approach to Internet 
matters, most notably by creating the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). 
Moreover, in the years to follow, quite a few developing country governments, 
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including some leading players, evolved their positions in a more liberal and 
multistakeholder-friendly direction.  
 
Nevertheless, the desire among others for more state-led approaches has 
remained a configurative force on the global stage, and this has translated 
into actions in specific issue areas that have had or could come to have 
fragmentary effects. Arguably, some actions proposed or undertaken by the 
industrialized democratic countries that have consistently championed an 
open and integral global public Internet at times have had fragmentary 
implications as well. The need for attention to these issues is thus universal. 
 
Content and Censorship 
 
As with the advent of previous communications technologies like print and 
radio, concerns about the substantive content of the information flowing 
across borders arose early in the globalization of the Internet in general and 
the web in particular. And once again, the contested interplay between the 
overarching principles of the free flow of information and national sovereignty 
would configure a good deal of the politics of Internet communications in the 
decades to follow. This tension was already embodied in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, while Article 19 states that every individual has, 
“the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers”, Article 29 holds that “everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the 
purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms 
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and 
the general welfare in a democratic society ... These rights and freedoms may 
in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations,”29 which privilege the rights of the sovereign nation-states whose 
government make such determinations. Moreover, the ITU Constitution gives 
states the right to cut off, in accordance with their national laws, “any private 
telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State 
or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency”.30 
 
So governments have a certain leeway in determining what is inconsistent 
with the national security and public order of their respective societies. In 
Germany, propaganda with Nazi symbols is forbidden, but in the United 
States it is protected speech under the First Amendment to the US 
Constitution. A freedom fighter in the eyes of one government may be a 
terrorist in the eyes of another country. Discussions in assemblies like the UN 
Human Rights Council, the Council of Europe (COE), the UN General 
Assembly and the WSIS have demonstrated the difficulties of agreeing on a 
common understanding about how the rights enshrined in Article 19 are to be 
interpreted and guaranteed. A good deal of progress has been made in 
fleshing out the relevance and applicability of international human rights laws 
to the Internet, but in the meanwhile governments often have operationalized 
 34 
sovereignty viz. the Internet in accordance with their national laws and 
preferences. 
 
Accordingly, the range of national approaches taken towards content 
regulation and censorship has grown steadily over the years. Documenting 
the techniques used and their incidence worldwide is the focus of a 
substantial literature and many online activist campaigns and information 
repositories, the contents of which we need not summarize here.31 But 
scholars associated with the Open Network Initiative have offered a handy 
summary overview by documenting the evolution of efforts to censor or 
otherwise control expression and access to information across three 
“generations”, as follows. 
 
The first generation of controls centred on filtering cross-border information 
flows, e.g. by continuously blocking servers, domain names, IP addresses, or 
keywords via filtering software or by inserting instructions into choke point 
routers at international gateways or among ISPs. Second-generation 
techniques expanded to include laws and regulations supplementing and 
legitimizing such technical measures by establishing notice and takedown 
requirements; lawful interception procedures; expansive cybersecurity 
requirements; the application of long-standing speech restrictions from the 
offline world pertaining to child abuse, slander, sedition, defamation and hate 
speech and to mass media veracity and objectivity; and the forced registration 
of websites, bloggers and users, or the revoking of ISP licences.  
 
New types of technical interference sprouted up as well, sometimes provided 
by “rent a hacker” and other commercial operations. These could include 
network disconnections and resets; “just in time” event-oriented disruptions 
made to look like technical errors; distributed denial of service attacks 
launched by networks of compromised “zombie” computers; or DNS cache 
poisoning attacks that can cause a name server to return an incorrect IP 
address and divert traffic to an attacker's or other unintended computer. 
Finally, with contemporary third-generation controls, “The focus is less on 
denying access than successfully competing with potential threats through 
effective counter-information campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or 
demoralize opponents. Third-generation controls also focus on the active use 
of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse and entrap 
opponents.”32 
 
Without delving deeper into this vast terrain, what matters here is that some of 
these approaches clearly introduce fragmentation. Filtering and blocking; 
launching disruptive attacks with lasting effects on websites or other 
information resources; or denying access to social networks and applications 
used by millions and even billions of other users – actions like these fragment 
global public cyberspace.  
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Often the damage done is restricted to particular user populations and swaths 
of content and experience, but sometimes there also are knock-on effects that 
ramify across the network of networks. While from a technical standpoint the 
Internet’s overall security and stability have not been imperilled, the 
untrammelled proliferation of such practices, especially in combination with 
other sources of fragmentation, significantly detracts from the Internet’s power 
as an engine of global development and empowerment. A human rights-
centred analysis of these and other efforts to impede the exercise of 
internationally recognized rights such as freedom of expression and access to 
information would be an important addition to our understanding of 
fragmentation. 
 
E-Commerce and Trade 
 
When the globalization and commercialization of the Internet took off in the 
early 1990s, many governments were uncertain about its significance for 
economic growth and development and slow to adjust to the emerging 
realities. But today it is widely if not universally understood that networked 
commerce and trade are a key driver and growth pole of the world economy. 
Indeed, it is becoming commonplace today to speak of a shift to an “Internet 
economy”, arguably with more justification than there was for some of the 
antecedent terms employed in earlier phases of the digital age like the “post-
industrial” or “new” economy. How to measure its precise size and shape 
remains a vexing question with which economists continue to struggle.33 But, 
for example, one widely noted estimate is that by 2016, the Internet economy 
will be worth $4.2 trillion in the G-20 countries alone.34  
 
Given the economic stakes involved, governments everywhere are working to 
assess the opportunities and risks and to devise national digital strategies. 
This includes many governments in the Least Developed Countries. The 
evidence available in a variety of studies suggests a strong relationship 
between openness to the Internet and wealth creation.35 Nevertheless, 
governments are often tempted to play for time and pursue approaches that 
preference national/regional players and digital spaces, including by 
restraining first-moving companies from abroad. In this context, the 
predominance of US technology companies in key market segments has led 
some governments to consider or adopt laws and regulatory practices that 
hinder certain kinds of operations and transactions or block the use of 
particular tools, be it social networking platforms or cross-border delivery via 
3D printing.  
 
Such practices have fuelled concerns that we may be entering a new phase 
of digital protectionism.36 This charge may be rejected by other actors who 
argue that governments are merely trying to cope with a range of 
unprecedented challenges to their national identities and independence, tax 
bases, citizens’ rights, and so on. For example, in September 2015, 51 
Members of the European Parliament issued a statement that they were 
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“surprised and concerned about the strong statements coming from US 
sources about regulatory and legislative proposals on the digital agenda for 
the EU. While many of these are still in very early stages, President Obama 
spoke of 'digital protectionism', and many in the private sector echo similar 
words … Artificially deepening the Transatlantic divide on digital topics is not 
what we need. Instead, let's build trust and exchange ideas, but accept that a 
variety of views are an integral part of our open democracies.”37 
 
While such strains and tensions are a cause for concern, there are also signs 
of progress in opening markets on the Internet. At the multilateral level, the 
15-19 December 2015 Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreed to maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties 
on electronic transmissions until its next session in 2017, and to breathe new 
life into the conceptually and politically difficult Work Programme on Electronic 
Commerce.38 In addition, participants in the Information Technology 
Agreement established a timetable for eliminating tariffs on a wide range of 
products of direct relevance to the vitality of the Internet economy. 
 
At the plurilateral level, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations 
concluded on 5 October 2015 produced a text with strong liberalization 
commitments on telecommunications and electronic commerce. Among other 
things, the latter proscribes barriers to the cross-border transfer of 
information, as well as requirements that companies use or locate computing 
facilities in a member’s territory as a condition to do business there. Similarly, 
work continues on the Trade in Services Agreement and the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership, and the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) is pursuing a substantial work 
program that includes a focus on preserving an open Internet. And at the 
regional level, the European Union (EU) is actively pursuing its 
multidimensional Digital Single Market initiative, while the African Union, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and others are advancing their 
respective programs to promote digital trade. 
 
In short, global electronic commerce and the Internet economy been 
normalized into the global trade policy arena, and as such are becoming 
subject to its characteristic tensions and countervailing trends. What does this 
mean for Internet fragmentation? This is at best a nascent conversation, but 
one can imagine at least two contending position. On the one hand, it could 
be argued that any barrier to trade over the Internet constitutes a prima facie 
example of fragmentation at the content and transactions layer. On the other 
hand, it also could be argued that some barriers do not completely block 
transactions, but rather just increase the cost and difficulty of doing business, 
i.e. the “e-friction” involved.39 At a minimum, it seems clear that digital 
protectionism that blocks users’ access to and use of key platforms and tools 
needed for electronic commerce constitutes fragmentation on the Internet. 
 
 
 37 
National Security 
 
While the military and intelligence establishments of countries like the United 
States began to think about the interplay between the global Internet and 
national security in the 1990s, most governments did not really focus on the 
matter until the beginning of this century. The terrorist attacks on 11 
September 2001 in the United States proved to be catalytic. At the national 
level, many governments took cues from the US Patriot Act legislation and 
began to elaborate policies, although there was no shared global 
understanding about the precise boundaries and conduct of national security 
protections.  
 
At the international level, 9/11 helped to push the quick adoption of the COE’s 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime in October 2001. The agreement came 
into force in 2004 and now has more than 50 members. The convention is a 
binding treaty that sets standards for some aspects of national law regarding 
substantive criminal and procedural laws, and it promotes international 
cooperation and mutual legal assistance among states. It also set out a 
shared framework regarding cybercrime by introducing definitions of hacking 
and other unauthorized access to networks and computers, but did not 
directly address broader questions of national security such as the rules of 
“information warfare” between states or between states or with non-state 
attackers. 
 
In the years to follow, the range and diversity of cyberattacks grew and further 
stimulated many governments to develop “national cybersecurity strategies”.40 
The protection of critical infrastructures and other national assets against 
political and economic cyberespionage at times led to planning for both 
defensive and offensive operations. Many governments began to treat 
national security as a concept that included and justified the control of political 
communications and cross-border content more generally. The slippery slide 
down this slope has been gathering momentum ever since. The Arab Spring 
begun in 2010 offered a significant example of how the Internet can help 
people organize for political change. Accordingly, some governments 
concluded that there was a need for more control over Internet 
communications, and perhaps even the need to centralize connections to 
allow for the termination of all Internet connections at a single point, as 
several Arab countries had done. Legislation introduced in the US Senate in 
2010 to require an “Internet kill switch” was not passed, but it helped to foster 
a line of thought within some governments. 
 
All this deepened the above-mentioned trends towards the spread of 
restrictive national laws and practices to block online content and the use of 
social networks in countries like Turkey, Iran, China, Pakistan, Russia, the 
former Asian Soviet republics, and many others. In the name of strengthening 
national security, more states built defensive “walls” of varying widths and 
heights around their territories and sought to channel Internet 
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communications via a limited number of gateways that could be more easily 
controlled. The 2013 Snowden revelations strengthened the drive, and the 
mistrust by some governments was extended also to US companies that 
operate globally, from Facebook and Google to Amazon and Apple. 
Proposals were discussed for “no spying” agreements and data localization 
practices began to take shape, as is discussed below.  
 
With regard to international instruments, in September 2011, China, Russia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan submitted to the UN General Assembly a call for a 
voluntary International Code of Conduct for Information Security. The draft 
code called on states to cooperate, inter alia, to curb “the dissemination of 
information that incites terrorism, secessionism or extremism or that 
undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well as 
their spiritual and cultural environment … reaffirm all the rights and 
responsibilities of States to protect … their information space and critical 
information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage … 
[and] lead all elements of society, including its information and communication 
partnerships with the private sector, to understand their roles and 
responsibilities with regard to information security.”41 A revised text submitted 
in 2015 softened the language in hopes of garnering broader support, but the 
underlying desires remain evident in other actions and pronouncements by its 
proponents. In contrast, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) continue to discuss a legally binding instrument for 
cybersecurity, as was proposed during their 2014 summit meeting in 
Fortaleza.  
 
In a similar spirit, in the summer of 2015, the Group of 77 and China 
submitted an input for the High Level Meeting to review progress on the WSIS 
agenda at the UN General Assembly held on 15-16 December 2015. The 
document argued that governments should “proscribe the use of the Internet 
for activities that are illegal, unlawful, and detrimental to the global law and 
order. Any pictures, videos, and messages that incite violence and/or promote 
terrorist activities should not be allowed to be circulated on the Internet.”42 In 
short, to promote national security, a number of governments are calling for 
multilateral agreements under which they could police a potentially wide 
range of messages with full international political legitimacy.  
 
Other governments are proceeding more cautiously in keeping with the 
complexity of the emerging issues. Based in part on the ideas laid down in the 
2014 Tallinn Manual, the NATO states are arguing for the use of the existing 
international treaties, such as the 1948 Geneva Conventions on Humanitarian 
Law, as the legal basis for military conflicts in cyberspace. The Group of 
Governmental Experts operating under the 1st Committee of the UN General 
Assembly is working towards a common understanding of cybersecurity, in 
particular in the military field. The first results of this effort include agreements 
on transparency in national cybersecurity strategies and a set of confidence 
building measures, such as a July 2015 agreement on intergovernmental 
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cooperation and communication in cases of cyberattacks. The September 
2015 US-Chinese agreement to ban economic cyberespionage was an 
important step, and similar efforts are under way in the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. The African Union adopted a Convention 
on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection in July 2014. 
 
The above concise summary of a huge area of activity points to three broad 
conclusions. First, national policies that entail blocking and censoring the 
Internet, or centralizing points of international interconnection in order to allow 
for “kill switch”-type responses, introduce fragmentation at different levels of 
the Internet. Second, cyberattacks that damage foreign networks and key 
assets in ways that cannot be quickly repaired may also cause fragmentation. 
And third, international policy frameworks that provide international political 
legitimacy for restrictive responses also could be supportive sources of 
Internet fragmentation. 
 
Privacy and Data Protection 
 
Prior to the Internet’s take-off as a global platform for e-commerce in the 
1990s, the blossoming of data communications and information services in 
private networks gave rise to concerns about what was happening within 
these transnational corporate cyberspaces. At a conference organized by the 
OECD in 1974, an expert group dubbed the phenomena ‘‘transborder data 
flows’’ (TDF), which in contrast to ‘‘international’’ data flows invoked a mental 
image of corporate activities unmediated by territorial boundaries and 
authority, and raised the question of whether it constituted a problem of 
sufficient importance to merit regulatory action.43 
 
Privacy and data protection for the transfer of personally identifiable 
information transmitted across borders quickly emerged as driving concern in 
this debate. Of particular concern were the different levels of protection 
afforded by the omnibus legislation being adopted in many European 
countries and the more limited and issue-specific laws being adopted in the 
United States. To square the circle and find common ground that would help 
facilitate both data flows and a sufficient level of protection, in 1980 the OECD 
established nonbinding but useful Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, which were revised for the Internet age 
in 2013. These set out basic principles, inter alia, on the collection, quality, 
usage and protection of personal data, as well as the rights of data subjects. 
Going further, in 1981, the COE adopted a related treaty instrument, the 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data; in 1995, the EU established its Data Protection 
Directive, which is soon to be superseded by a General Data Protection 
Regulation; in 2000, EU and the United States agreed their Safe Harbor 
agreement to provide a streamlined way for US-based companies to satisfy 
the EU Directive’s “adequacy” requirements through voluntary self-
certification; in 2005, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation adopted a 
 40 
Privacy Framework; and so on. These plurilateral and regional agreements 
went a long way towards ensuring the continuity of TDF, although of course 
many privacy advocates would prefer further progress on data protection. 
 
Efforts to harmonize privacy and data protection on a broader multilateral 
basis are still in a very early stage. But in December 2014, the UN General 
Assembly agreed to establish the position of a special rapporteur for privacy 
under the UN Human Rights Council. The mandate of the rapporteur includes, 
inter alia, the analysis of national privacy and data protection legislation. Such 
reporting could help to identify issues for elaboration in any effort to devise a 
global framework. 
 
These issues became more contentious following the 2013 revelations by 
Edward Snowden. On 6 October 2015, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
determined, inter alia, that the 2000 US-European Union “Safe Harbor” 
agreement is invalid; that the European Commission (EC) was not competent 
to restrict the powers of national data protection authorities; and that the Irish 
data protection authority is required to decide whether the transfer of data 
pertaining to Facebook’s European subscribers to the United States for 
processing should be suspended on the ground that that country does not 
afford an adequate level of protection of personal data. The decision has 
been heralded as a victory by privacy advocates and many civil libertarians, 
but has left companies and the US government scrambling to work out new 
arrangements to avoid service disruptions while meeting the privacy 
concerns. The EU issued supportive guidance on trans-Atlantic data transfers 
on 6 November 2015, and efforts to find solutions are advancing. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that the Safe Harbor decision comes just one year 
after ECJ’s Right to be Forgotten ruling that allows individuals to apply to 
search providers to have hyperlinks removed from the search results based 
on their names on the grounds that these links are harmful and meet the 
criteria for being suppressed. In addition to the palpable tension between the 
individual’s new right of removal and the public’s right to access information, it 
is noteworthy that this ruling applies to search engine operators if they have a 
branch or a subsidiary in an EU member state even if the server processing 
the data is located abroad. To the extent that the ruling is used to remove 
links to information that remains in the public domain, one could argue that its 
implementation introduces a measure of fragmentation. 
 
Not surprisingly, some advocates of unfettered TDF have questioned whether 
the motivation behind EU privacy policy is not digital protectionism and, even 
if it is not, whether the policy might not anyway be inadvertently employed to 
protectionist effects. This sort of talk has caused privacy advocates and 
European policy-makers to object that, as one scholar put it, “A review of the 
historical record concerning the evolution of data flow restrictions in EU data 
protection law indicates that they are based more on policy considerations, 
 41 
such as avoiding circumvention of the law and guarding against specific data 
processing risks in other countries, than on protectionism.”44  
 
In general, the strains between advanced industrial democracies with respect 
to the scope and modalities of privacy and data protection are best seen in 
the light of differences in legitimate policy preferences and legal systems. 
They can increase the level of digital friction and costs involved in some 
business processes, but they generally have not blocked flows and actively 
caused fragmentation on the Internet. On the other hand, in the context of 
new data localization requirements (discussed next), strict privacy rules that 
deter or prohibit data flows have been introduced by some governments that 
are not otherwise known to be privacy defenders. Such privacy rules could be 
seen as having fragmentary effects.  
 
Data Localization 
 
As noted at the outset of this paper, the post-Snowden uptick in data 
localization proposals and policies has been a major driver in pushing 
fragmentation up the agendas of business and governments and into the 
mass media space. But as with Internet fragmentation more generally, “data 
localization” is a multidimensional construct. And here too, the scholarly and 
policy literatures on the matter are nascent and a bit thin. Discussions of the 
issue often draw principally on a few cases, which makes it a bit difficult to 
generalize and arrive at a completely satisfactory definition of the problem. 
But one observer has offered a broad yet seemingly sufficient definition, 
suggesting that localization be understood as comprising, “laws that limit the 
storage, movement, and/or processing of data to specific geographies and 
jurisdictions, or that limit the companies that can manage data based upon 
the company’s nation of incorporation or principal sites of operations and 
management”.45 
 
This formulation encompasses five distinct types of territorially-based 
restrictions. First, there are requirements that data be processed by entities 
located within a given jurisdiction. Second there are requirements that data be 
locally stored or “resident”. Third are network architectures and routing 
changes that strongly encourage or require data to circulate largely or solely 
within a territorial space. Examples here could include Deutsche Telekom’s 
proposal to reroute data within Germany, or the seemingly now abandoned 
concept of a “Schengen Cloud”. Fourth are discriminatory policies that select 
the organizations that may perform any of these tasks based on their national 
origins. And fifth are restrictions on the transborder movement of certain 
categories of data, e.g. requirements of prior consent, or outright bans. If one 
examines the scattered but important evidence of localization policies in place 
today, there is notable variability as to the precise mix from these five types of 
restrictions that is applied in any given country.  
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With the exception of the proposed routing schemes, these types of 
localization are not really new. Indeed it is probably the case that they are 
more widespread and long-standing in certain sectors and issue-areas than is 
commonly recognized. For example, there is anecdotal evidence that the 
operators of websites and services associated with certain government-run or 
parastatal national ccTLDs are obliged to use nationally-based servers and 
providers for data processing and storage. More generally, it seems probable 
that many governments have localization requirements pertaining to certain 
types of public sector information, especially with respect to national security 
matters. Even the United States has at times looked askance at certain 
foreign vendors seeking entry to markets deemed sensitive, sought to restrict 
the cross-border flow of encryption technologies, and most likely has some 
selective limitations on where government data is processed and stored. Such 
instances would seem ripe for investigation in the context of any “deep dive” 
assessment of localization practices. 
 
These special cases aside, mainstream business processes previously have 
gotten a hard look and at times been the focus of local process/storage 
requirements and data flow limitations. During the above-mentioned TDF 
debate of the 1970s-1980s, an issued raise at the outset concerned possible 
vulnerabilities to disruption when relying on information held in foreign 
jurisdictions. An often-cited example concerned the Malmö fire department, 
which located all its data on local fire hazards and facilities in a General 
Electric computer in Ohio, rather than in Sweden. What would happen if the 
systems involved performed poorly or went down entirely amidst an 
emergency? Building out from such examples, many governments began to 
express concerns that their “information sovereignty” could be imperilled if 
important data was not processed and stored within their national boundaries. 
It did not take long for the overarching issue to be cast as “TDF vs national 
sovereignty”, or for a whole host of socio-cultural, legal, economic and 
political issues to be raised within this framing. Such expansive framings of 
sovereignty are today enjoying something of a come-back, as is discussed 
below. 
 
Possible regulatory and other solutions were considered both in the OECD 
and the Intergovernmental Bureau of Informatics, a now defunct organization 
with over 40 members, mostly developing countries.46 In parallel, some 
governments began to enact localization requirements and restrictions on 
TDF. A notable example was Brazil, which in 1976 required local processing 
and prior approval to transfer certain kinds of business data out of the 
country. But a number of other countries considered or took tentative steps to 
impose localization requirements and cross-border limitations as well.47 
 
In the end, the argument prevailed that imposing data localization 
requirements and impeding data flows would do more harm than good. The 
calls from new multilateral regulations gave way to the adoption of regional 
and plurilateral instruments that effectively locked in a rough consensus 
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among the key players that corporate TDF should generally occur without 
governmental impediments. The incipient national restrictions were generally 
lifted or softened, the Intergovernmental Bureau of Informatics was shut 
down, and in 1985 the OECD adopted a broadly framed Declaration on 
Transborder Data Flows that invoked the need to ensure access to data held 
abroad but generally urged governments to avoid the creation of barriers and 
limitations. 
 
Flash forward 30 years and many of the same arguments that were raised 
about data flows over private corporate networks are being revisited and 
augmented with respect to the Internet. Concerted efforts to enhance 
international dialogue and cooperation and the mobilization of domestic critics 
has reduced some of the pressure and led some governments to reconsider 
their initial reactions. Brazil again provides a key example, having removed a 
data localization requirement before passing its Marco Civil law in April 2014. 
Nevertheless, other countries have moved forward with a variety of plans, 
sometimes with the strong support of nationally-based companies and social 
constituencies that believe they will benefit from restrictions.  
 
The Russian government has taken the most widely commented-on initiative. 
Effective 1 September 2015, ITS law requires companies to process and 
store data about Russian citizens on servers within the country. It is unclear 
just how consistently or aggressively the law will be applied. While there are 
reports of US-based multinational companies investing in new facilities in 
order to comply, there are also reports that key Internet firms have been able 
to work out arrangements or have otherwise been exempted from some 
requirements.48 Either way, as the law is “the latest in a string of about 20 
laws tightening government control of the Internet” since 2012, it would 
appear to be part of a comprehensive policy framework.49  
 
China also has added data localization requirements to its longstanding 
comprehensive policy framework to the Internet. In 2013, personal data 
protection guidelines were adopted to regulate “all or part of the process of 
processing personal information through information systems”, and these are 
reported to apply “to all kinds of organizations and institutions other than the 
government agencies and other institutions which exercise public 
management responsibilities”. Among their provisions is that, “Absent express 
consent of the subject of the personal information, or explicit legal or 
regulatory permission, or absent the consent of the competent authorities, the 
administrator of personal information shall not transfer the personal 
information to any overseas receiver of personal information, including any 
individuals located overseas or any organizations and institutions registered 
overseas.”50 While the guidelines are technically voluntary, it is reported that, 
“The government distributed a document to some American tech companies 
earlier this summer, in which it asked the companies to promise they would 
not harm China’s national security and would store Chinese user data within 
the country … The letter also asks the American companies to ensure their 
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products are ‘secure and controllable,’ a catchphrase that industry groups 
said could be used to force companies to build so-called back doors – which 
allow third-party access to systems – provide encryption keys or even hand 
over source code.”51 In parallel, the Ministry of Public Security reportedly 
plans to set up “network security offices” staffed by police within major 
Internet companies.52 
 
Other countries, including some industrialized democracies, have 
implemented data localization as piecemeal solution to specific issues. For 
example, Australia prohibits the export of personally identifiable health 
records; Switzerland requires the prior consent of data subjects before 
financial records can be transferred across borders; some Canadian 
provinces require that some government institutions store personal data 
domestically; South Korea is said to prohibit the storage of mapping data on 
servers outside the country; and so on. The policies being proposed or 
enacted by many governments of all political persuasion are diverse in 
substantive scope and technological modalities, but collectively they point to a 
more densely bordered operating environment for multinational firms.53 
 
In some cases, there may be reasons to question the motivations involved. 
For example, as noted above, some of the governments involved engage in 
quite significant levels of digital surveillance of their populations, and applying 
data localization requirements may simply make their jobs easier. Localization 
is also unlikely to greatly affect the operations of foreign intelligence agencies. 
As one analyst summarizes, “The notion that data must be stored 
domestically to ensure that it remains secure and private is false. In regard to 
security, while certain laws may impose minimum security standards, the 
security of data does not depend on where it is stored, only on the measures 
used to store it securely.”54 It may also be that multinational companies are 
more likely to effectively guard their customers’ data than some of the local 
alternatives. 
 
Localization may not succeed as an economic strategy, either. For example, 
two observers have argued that it “raises costs for local businesses, reduces 
access to global services for consumers, hampers local start-ups, and 
interferes with the use of the latest technological advances … Data 
localization, like most protectionist measures, leads only to small gains for a 
few local enterprises and workers, while causing significant harms spread 
across the entire economy. The domestic benefits of data localization go to 
the few owners and employees of data centres and the few companies 
servicing these centres locally.”55 In a similar vein, a group of economists 
reviewed recently proposed or enacted legislation in seven jurisdictions, and 
concluded that the negative impacts on GDP would in every case be 
substantial.56 Unsurprisingly then, some advocates of open TDF and digital 
trade are arguing that it is time for the WTO to take an active role, e.g. by 
enforcing existing trade laws that may be of relevance, extending its dispute 
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settlement mechanism and establishing a comprehensive database to track 
localization measures worldwide.57  
 
Data localization measures create high transaction and other costs across 
industry operations, require the reengineering of systems and services, and 
may not be in the best interests of national economies and citizens/end users. 
But what do they mean for the Internet itself? Data localization in the form of 
domestic processing and residency requirements, and the blocking of certain 
data flows, introduces new forms of fragmentation on the Internet at the 
content and transactions levels. Moreover, depending on how it was done, 
localization in the form of changes to the Internet’s routing arrangements 
could entail broader fragmentation. It may be that Internet technical 
administrators and operators would find ways to work around such barriers, 
but the risks would not be negligible. 
 
Cyber-Sovereignty  
 
The negotiations leading up to the UN General Assembly’s 15-16 December 
2015 10-year review of the WSIS highlighted that there remain fundamentally 
different conceptions among states of Internet governance that have 
important potential implications for fragmentation. For example, in a summer 
2015 input to the preparatory process, the Group of 77 and China invoked the 
centrality of sovereignty and territorial integrity with respect to surveillance;  
“Improving Internet governance should entail establishing a multilateral, 
democratic and transparent international Internet governance system that 
ensures participation of all Governments, reasonable allocation of Internet 
resources, and joint management of key Internet infrastructure;” and 
suggested that, “The outcome document should consider establishing an 
intergovernmental forum on enhanced cooperation,” a term the coalition 
previously has interpreted to mean the creation of an intergovernmental body 
with broad global policy-making authority.58  
 
In parallel, the Russia government’s summer 2015 input offered the following 
draft declaratory provision: “We note the need to ensure security and 
resilience of the critical Internet infrastructure in order to prevent outside 
manipulation, and for this purpose we call upon States to implement the 
storage of personal data of their citizens inside the territory of their own 
countries, to place domestic servers serving national segments of the Internet 
and to develop other elements of the critical Internet infrastructure.”59 In fact, 
the need to establish a clearly demarcated “national Internet segment” subject 
to strong governmental oversight has been an increasingly consistent theme 
of Russian policy pronouncements at both the domestic and international 
levels in recent years.  
 
After intensive negotiations, none of this language was included in the final 
WSIS+10 Review outcome document that was approved by the General 
Assembly. To the contrary, the approved text for the first time paired 
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multilateral cooperation with multistakeholder cooperation in a generally 
sound and balanced outcome. But the build up to the 15-16 December WSIS 
High-Level Meeting did demonstrate that 10 years after the WSIS 
negotiations, some governments still desire to enshrine and build out state 
sovereignty as an organizing premise of national and global Internet 
governance. 
 
On 16-18 December 2015, the government of China convened its second 
annual World Internet Conference. President Xi Jinping gave a keynote 
speech indicating that the promotion of “cybersovereignty” was the 
foundational principle of the Chinese vision of Internet governance. The 
President averred that, “The principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the 
Charter of the United Nations is one of the basic norms in contemporary 
international relations. It covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, which 
also includes cyberspace … We should respect the right of individual 
countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development and 
model of cyber regulation and participate in international cyberspace 
governance on an equal footing …The existing rules governing cyberspace 
hardly reflect the desires and interests of the majority of countries …There 
should be no unilateralism [in building an Internet governance system]. 
Decisions should not be made with one party calling the shots or only a few 
parties discussing among themselves.”60 Russian Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev reportedly supported Xi Jinping’s proposals in his own speech, 
indicating that China and Russia are acting in close partnership to promote 
this principle of governance. 
 
The linked concepts of “national Internet segments” and “cybersovereignty” 
imply Internet that, like the traditional public switched telephone networks of 
the pre-market liberalization era, the Internet’s technical architecture should 
be organized into a series of vertically segmented, stand-alone national 
domains with interconnecting international gateways to hand off traffic. 
Control of the architecture and its usage to constitute discrete cyberspaces of 
content and transactions could provide the basis for a wide range of 
fragmentation-inducing national policies that some governments are already 
pursuing, and if embraced elsewhere could encourage such policies’ 
replication and extension into new arenas. Of course, it is possible that these 
schematic vision statements will not have the readily imaged fragmenting 
effects in implementation. But the actions taken of late with respect to data 
localization and other issues may suggest otherwise. Either way, dialogue 
and clarification of their operational meaning would be useful. 
 
Concern about the possible strengthening and spread of these orientations 
has influenced Internet governance processes in arenas beyond the WSIS 
Review. For example, the current drive to transition stewardship of the IANA 
functions from the US government to ICANN and its multistakeholder 
community has been lent added urgency by fears that any failure could 
encourage discontented governments to contemplate more fragmenting 
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actions, in the worst case scenario including backing a separate root. Hence, 
as Fadi Chehadé, the outgoing ICANN President and CEO has put it, “If we 
cannot find a way to govern the Internet on an equal footing, in an open 
transparent way this year, we might descend into a fragmented version of the 
Internet …The moment we fragment the Internet it is possible there will be 
tariffs between borders, there will be rules ... it will not be the Internet as we 
know it.”61 
 
Other global multistakeholder collaborations also have been working to 
promote an open and unfragmented Internet. Participants in the 2014 
NETmundial meeting in São Paulo adopted a set of principles and a roadmap 
for future collaboration in Internet governance that was decidedly of this 
character. Indeed, one of the overarching principles agreed to in the 
NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement was that the “Internet should 
continue to be a globally coherent, interconnected, stable, unfragmented, 
scalable and accessible network-of-networks, based on a common set of 
unique identifiers and that allows data packets/information to flow freely end-
to-end regardless of the lawful content.”62 The annual IGF meetings too have 
devoted significant time over the past decade to exploring the themes of 
Internet openness and access, and have featured sessions concerned with 
Internet fragmentation. And “native” Internet bodies like the IETF, the RIRs 
and the Internet Society are all pursuing work programs promoting a stable, 
open and unfragmented Internet. 
 
In sum, we still have two competing, broad-based visions at work with respect 
to the role of governments and the character of public policy with respect to 
the Internet. It is unclear how their interplay will influence the prevalence of 
Internet fragmentation in the years ahead, but it is seems reasonable to 
assume that even if some governments opt anew for a vision of open 
networks, communications and markets, others who rule a significant share of 
the global Internet’s user population could be moving in other directions that 
expand the scope of government-induced Internet fragmentation.  
 
For now, some close observers are extrapolating from the current signs and 
arriving at dark visions of the future. For example, Eugene Kaspersky argues 
that, “What may prove to be the ultimate game-changer is the fragmentation 
of the Internet…If the trend spreads, which is likely, such fragmentation will 
bring about the creation of parallel networks as governments the world over 
try to isolate their critically important communications. Such networks with no 
physical connection to the Internet are already widely used for military 
communications. Internet fragmentation will bring about a paradoxical de-
globalization of the world, as communications within national borders among 
governmental bodies and large national companies become increasingly 
localized … As a result, the whole notion of netizens, or global online citizens, 
and of the Internet being a global village could lose all practical meaning. 
What could emerge is a patchwork of online nation states with different rules 
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and regulations and hindered communications.”63 Avoiding such a future will 
require vigilance, dialogue and cooperation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section we have highlighted 10 examples of governmentally-induced 
fragmentation: 
 
1. Filtering and blocking websites, social networks or other resources offering 
undesired contents 
2. Attacks on information resources offering undesired contents 
3. Digital protectionism blocking users’ access to and use of key platforms 
and tools for electronic commerce 
4. Centralizing and terminating international interconnection 
5. Attacks on national networks and key assets  
6. Local data processing and/or retention requirements 
7. Architectural or routing changes to keep data flows within a territory  
8. Prohibitions on the transborder movement of certain categories of data 
9. Strategies for “national Internet segments” or expansive 
“cybersovereignty”  
10. International frameworks intended to legitimize restrictive practices  
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4. Commercial Fragmentation 
 
A variety of critics have charged that certain commercial practices by 
technology companies also may contribute to Internet fragmentation. The 
nature of the alleged fragmentation often pertains to the organization of 
specific markets and digital spaces and the experiences of users that choose 
to participate in them, but sometimes it can impact the technical infrastructure 
and operational environments for everyone. Whether or not one considers 
commercial practices as meriting the same level of concern as, say, data 
localization is of course a matter of perspective. Certainly there are significant 
concerns from the perspectives of many Internet users, activists and 
competing providers in global markets.  
 
As such, the issues are on the table in the growing global dialogue about 
fragmentation, and they therefore merit consideration here. Accordingly, in 
this section we briefly survey five sets of issues: peering and standardization; 
network neutrality; walled gardens; geo-localization and geo-blocking; and 
infrastructure-related intellectual property protection.  
 
Peering and Standardization 
 
In Section 2, we noted that the complex system of private peering and transit 
contracts among ISPs has ensured the provision of a stable, integrated global 
public Internet. The economic models employed in interconnection 
arrangements historically were based on a "sender keeps all" approach to 
revenues that contrasted sharply with the regulated and administratively 
heavy accounting and settlements systems of revenue division used in the 
traditional telecommunications industry.  
 
With the exponential growth in traffic and other factors, there has been some 
evolution towards the exchange of payments in some connections. 
Nevertheless, the system generally has avoided descending into 
bureaucratization and divisive bargaining over revenues.64 A concern to keep 
an eye on, though, is whether the incentives to some operators may change 
in ways that challenge the system’s preservation. For example, one leading 
observer has argued that, “The incentives to preserve peering, and the 
broader linkage it promotes across the physical layer, are diminishing,” and 
“changes in the backbone market ... could break down the traditional peering 
equilibrium.”65  
 
On a related note, at the ITU’s December 2012 World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT), the European Telecommunications 
Network Operators’ Association proposed treaty language that would have 
established a telephony-style “sending party pays” system under which 
content providers would have to pay to have their information delivered, in 
addition to their existing fees for connectivity. This would by extension impact 
inter-carrier relations; as Cerf, Ryan and Senges have concluded, “If adopted, 
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the proposal would have completely undermined the economic model of the 
Internet … Such a model would have devastated the openness of the Internet 
because providers of free content would have had to pay additional fees, 
effectively increasing the digital divide by forcing economic choices that would 
benefit only the telecommunications service providers.”66 While the idea was 
ultimately rejected, it is not inconceivable that in the future some leading ISPs 
may seek to change the terms on which they interconnect and are 
compensated in ways that ultimately could result in fragmentation. 
 
Another issue to watch is technical standardization. There have long been 
concerns in the global telecommunications environment about competing 
and/or proprietary standards being adopted and deployed in ways that limit 
interconnectivity. And as the Internet becomes ever more central to all global 
communications, the number and diversity of standards and standards 
organizations involved in diverse corners of the ecosystem has greatly 
increased. Some analysts worry that standards blocs could emerge around 
different organizations and commit to divergent technologies in ways that 
impact certain uses of the Internet.  
 
An immediate concern relates to the IoT. Appliances of all kinds are being 
developed with the ability to use the Internet, the web, and wired and wireless 
access methods to become part of the global Internet. Signs of such a 
development were evident as early as 2000 when the Ceiva company 
announced an Internet-enabled picture frame, but the tidal wave of 
development is rising visibly in this second decade of the 21st Century. 
Today, planning for the IoT is central to not only the industrial Internet and the 
digital transformation of industries, but also the digital home and beyond. 
 
Many different industry groups and international organizations are hard at 
work developing different solutions to IoT standards requirements. Standards 
competition in the global marketplace is generally a healthy thing, but from 
standpoints of the users and other players, the adoption of proprietary 
standards in key arenas like the IoT could produce fragmenting effects. As the 
Internet Society has warned, “A fragmented environment of proprietary IoT 
technical implementations will inhibit value for users and industry. While full 
interoperability across products and services is not always feasible or 
necessary, purchasers may be hesitant to buy IoT products and services if 
there is integration inflexibility, high ownership complexity, and concern over 
vendor lock-in … In addition to increasing the costs of standards 
development, the absence of coordination across efforts could ultimately 
produce conflicting protocols, delay product deployment, and lead to 
fragmentation across IoT products, services, and industry verticals.”67 
 
Network Neutrality 
 
The long-running and globally spreading debate on network neutrality has 
deeply divided analysts, policy-makers and stakeholders for years. In very 
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broad terms, it is a debate that has pitted public interest advocates, much of 
the Internet technical community, and online content providers, on the one 
hand, against a diverse array of telecommunications and cable network 
operators and ISPs, on the other. To the former, it is imperative that all data 
on the Internet be handled in the same non-discriminatory manner, with no 
variations based on the type of user, content, application, equipment, or mode 
of communication involved. To the latter, it is more imperative that network 
providers be able to differentiate along these lines in order to optimally shape 
traffic, manage network resources and recover the costs of operation so as to 
be able to continually invest in upkeep and expansion of their networks and 
services. Policy-makers have been equally divided in their alignments and 
preferences based on a variety of national conditions. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, we need not delve into the details of this 
debate, the complexities of which go far beyond what can be captured in a 
brief characterization such as the above. What matters here is to note that in 
the view of many keen observers (and not necessarily just net neutrality 
proponents), there can be an integral linkage between non-neutral treatment 
and Internet fragmentation. 
 
There is certainly no question that some ISPs worldwide have deliberately 
inhibited some applications. There have been attempts to wholly block voice 
over IP (VOIP) or streaming video either to prevent users from gaining access 
to alternatives to conventional telephony or to “protect” other users from 
“excessive” bandwidth consumption. There also have been efforts to “throttle” 
bandwidth by slowing peer-to-peer and other applications, inter alia to 
regulate network traffic and minimize bandwidth congestion; monetize scarcity 
by offering quality of services guarantees for preferred uses; or force users to 
purchase “enhanced” services.  
 
Depending on the circumstances, some of these practices may be among 
those deemed to violate the net neutrality rules articulated in the US by the 
Federal Communication Commission, or to violate similar rules in other 
national or regional jurisdictions. Blocking of this kind can be achieved by 
dropping packets that reference particular protocols, modifying domain name 
resolvers to inhibit successful translation of domain names to IP addresses, or 
mapping the domain names into alternative addresses under the control of 
the provider of name resolution services.  
 
In a related form of fragmentation, an ISP might simply interfere with the flow 
of traffic to or from particular destinations in an attempt to make that access 
sufficiently unsatisfactory that a user may be compelled to use application 
services provided by the ISP or others favoured by the ISP. Such choices by 
network operators can have significant implications for content creators and 
Internet users.  
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A touchstone for the debate on this point was a widely noted 2009 article by 
Robin S. Lee and Tim Wu. The authors argued that in the United States there 
is a de facto “zero-price” rule that bans an ISP from charging termination fees 
to content providers to reach its customers. “The rule also helps avoid the 
problems of Internet fragmentation, in which content providers who do not 
reach agreements with ISPs cannot access all customers, and consumers on 
a single ISP are foreclosed from accessing their content … [changing this] … 
would inevitably lead to fragmentation – where certain content would only be 
available on certain service providers – and hence multiple ‘Internets’.”68 
Other analysts have expanded on the argument by considering the role of 
online advertising, suggesting that in the absence of the zero-price rule, ISPs 
would “behave as editors, caring about the profitability of the content they 
carry. Hence, they have an incentive to induce fragmentation when (i) 
advertising revenues are potentially large but strongly diminished by 
competition among CPs, and (ii) contents are not highly valuable and 
complementary for consumers”.69  
 
Wherever one stands on net neutrality generally, the question remains: if it 
occurs that some content providers lose the ability to easily reach some 
customers and vice versa, does this not increase the levels of fragmentation 
in informational markets and the public sphere of ideas on the Internet? 
 
Walled Gardens 
 
The practice of erecting “walled gardens” is not new in the realm of electronic 
communication and information. With the development of the cable television 
industry came proprietary platforms that offered self-contained user 
environments. Similarly, with the popularization beyond business of computer 
networking in the 1980s and 1990s came operations like Prodigy, 
CompuServe, GENIE, America Online and thousands of Bulletin Board 
Systems. Reachable by dial-up modems, they were independent of each 
other and generally did not technologically interwork. As the Internet grew, it 
became a commonly accessible transport system for users to reach these 
services and many of the walls eventually came down to allow users inside 
each garden to reach out to others.  
 
Now with the development of smart mobile devices and the burgeoning “app 
economy”, walled gardens built on propriety platforms have vastly increased 
in number and diversity and migrated into our pockets. Search engines 
generally cannot index social and commercial networks like Twitter, 
Facebook, Snapchat, Amazon, eBay and FLICKR, among others, unless 
users are logged in. Some services may not be accessible through Internet 
browsers at all, so the user must use employ the access methods embedded 
in the mobile apps. Interestingly though, most of them do allow email 
exchanges so that a comment on a Facebook page, for instance, will show up 
in the user’s email and the user can respond via email as well as logging in to 
Facebook to respond.  
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In a walled garden, the application or service provider can have complete 
control over its own digital space, governing its inhabitants and their 
behaviour via its Terms of Service. This allows, inter alia, the creation of a 
secure and stable environment, the promulgation of a distinctive culture and 
client relationship, and the provision of a high-quality customer experience. It 
also allows providers to offer exclusive content, “lock in” customers via habits 
and sunk costs, and gain access to unchallenged long-term revenue streams.  
 
Obviously, a great many users find a good deal of value to “living” in walled 
gardens. Apple’s announcement that in the first week of January 2015 alone 
customers spent nearly half a billion dollars on apps and in-app purchases, 
and Facebook’s announcement that a billion people used its platform in a 
single day in August 2015, were clear indications of the widespread loyalty 
that has been cultivated.  
 
In 2010, Wired magazine’s former editor-in-chief and a colleague summarized 
the emerging reality by proclaiming, “The Web is Dead, Long Live the 
Internet”. They noted that, “One of the most important shifts in the digital 
world has been the move from the wide-open Web to semi-closed platforms 
that use the Internet for transport but not the browser for display. It’s driven 
primarily by the rise of the iPhone model of mobile computing, and it’s a world 
Google can’t crawl, one where HTML doesn’t rule. And it’s the world that 
consumers are increasingly choosing, not because they’re rejecting the idea 
of the Web but because these dedicated platforms often just work better or fit 
better into their lives (the screen comes to them, they don’t have to go to the 
screen). The fact that it’s easier for companies to make money on these 
platforms only cements the trend.”70 
 
Customer contentment notwithstanding, a growing number of observers have 
begun to raise concerns about some of the constraints imposed by the 
gardens and their governance. Leaving aside the grumbles one sometimes 
hears about the privacy, intellectual property and other policies entailed in 
some Terms of Service, what is relevant here is the fragmentation of 
cyberspaces that is thought to accompany the erection of such walls. Digital 
movement back and forth to the open web environment is limited, searching is 
limited, and there’s nothing comparable to number portability in the telephone 
world – one usually cannot take one’s accumulated digital persona and 
history or purchased materials to another platform, thus posing a sharp exit vs 
loyalty trade-off. Hence, from the standpoint of some analyst and 
stakeholders, having a growing share of digital life retreat behind companies’ 
walled gardens constitutes a form of fragmentation on the Internet. 
 
In a somewhat related vein, there is also a debate about whether the practice 
of “zero rating” induces fragmentation on the Internet. Zero-rating is the 
provision of services that do not incur data costs and are left out of data 
usage counts. Customers that do not have unmetered subscriptions are able 
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to access specific sources of content and services free of charge, whether 
because the ISP covers the costs to attract new customers or is paid by the 
sponsoring application and service vendors. The precise models used may 
vary across ISPs and content providers, as well as across countries.71 But in 
general, this can be beneficial to lower-income people, particularly in 
developing countries, who are new to the Internet or whose needs and usage 
are limited. On the other hand, many observers see this as a form of 
fragmentation because the user’s choices are constrained to a tiny subset of 
selected Internet sites, applications and services. 
 
Particular attention has been paid in this debate to the Free Basics platform. 
In cooperation with a half dozen other leading technology companies, 
Facebook has offering free services to low-income users in 19 (and counting) 
developing countries. Over 1 billion people are said to have access to these 
services, and software developers are invited to build products that can take 
residence on the platform, subject to certain guidelines. 
 
However altruistic the intent may be, this and similar projects have come in for 
criticism in some online and other spaces like the IGF. The critics charge that 
zero rating ends up violating net neutrality and favouring the supplier and its 
selected partners in a manner that limits peoples’ access to and 
understanding of the Internet. Indeed, a coalition of 67 civil society 
organizations wrote an open letter to Facebook’s CEO raising a number of 
concerns about the project, including that the new users, “could get stuck on a 
separate and unequal path to Internet connectivity, which will serve to widen – 
not narrow – the digital divide”.72 Facebook has taken this input on board and 
made improvements that address some of the concerns, but debate continues 
with respect to the underlying business model, and consumer uptake in some 
countries has been uneven. 
 
Finally, it is perhaps relevant to note that some observers worry that Internet 
users themselves may be taking a cue to erect experiential and socio-cultural 
walled gardens of their own. In 2002, law professor Cass Sustein made 
waves by arguing that the Internet fosters social fragmentation by 
encouraging people to organize into cloistered enclaves of the like-minded 
where everyone reinforces each other in blocking out unwanted or opposing 
viewpoints.73 In 2011, Eli Pariser took the thought further, arguing that 
corporate algorithms for searching, “liking”, “friending” and so forth can have 
the effect of constructing tightly constraining “filter bubbles” around people 
that place inconsonant ideas and information out of sight and out of mind.74 
This well-publicized concern has helped to spur the development of a cottage 
industry of academics and other analysts concerned with the relationships 
between algorithms and society in general and algorithms and the 
fragmentation of online identities and social formations in particular. Leaving 
aside the role of user choice, there are those who would argue that some 
algorithms could have the effect of limiting and thus fragmenting the 
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information made available to users. This is a complex matter that would 
require further consideration than is possible here. 
 
Geo-Localization and Geo-Blocking 
 
Geo-localization is the practice of identifying users’ locations by mapping their 
devices’ IP addresses. Companies thus are able to make fine-grained choices 
about which kinds of content it is acceptable to serve to the user based on his 
or her geographic location. One result is the geo-targeting of content to users 
situated in a legally or commercially congenial locality. Another is geo-
blocking, so that the materials in question are rendered inaccessible for 
access or purchase. A wide range of companies, particularly in the 
entertainment industries, have implemented geo-blocking in order to protect 
intellectual property and licensing relationships with local mass media 
distribution channels.  
 
In addition, as noted previously, governments may impose geo-blocking 
requirements to ensure compliance with local laws and customs. Online 
providers of news and entertainment, gambling services, alcohol and drugs, 
and so on can thus avoid running afoul of governments abroad. Indeed, some 
observers argue that the ability to target and constrain access may have 
beneficial effects from a civil liberties standpoint, since for example 
controversial forms of speech can be delivered to selected communities 
without concern for compliance with local community standards elsewhere.75 
 
That said, users often claim to find geo-blocking to be frustrating and 
annoying. Many people seemingly have come to expect that being on the 
global public Internet should give them full and unfettered access to publicly 
available content, so they experience the denial of such access as a form of 
fragmentation. Of course, installing VPN technology generally can circumvent 
geo-blocking, but this presumes a certain measure of technical facility, decent 
bandwidth and an ability to pay that may not characterize many user 
populations. In addition, while IPv4 addresses reportedly can be more 
accurately located for blocking than IPv6 addresses, the slow diffusion of IPv6 
provides the average user with little comfort in this regard. 
 
Importantly, the EC has taken an interest in the potential downsides of geo-
blocking for consumers. As part of its work program on the Digital Single 
Market, the EC is assessing the practice as a barrier to the construction of a 
border free space with adequate consumer protection. It reports that “74% of 
the complaints received by the European Consumer Centres Network 
regarding price differences or other geographical discrimination faced by 
consumers relate to online cross-border purchases … Sometimes these 
restrictions on supply and ensuing price differentiation can be justified, for 
instance where the seller needs to comply with specific legal obligations. 
However, in many cases online geo-blocking is not justified. These unjustified 
practices should be expressly prohibited so that EU consumers and 
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businesses can take full advantage of the single market in terms of choice 
and lower prices.”76  
 
Accordingly, the EC plans to make legislative proposals in the first half of 
2016 to end what it considers “unjustified” geo-blocking. In parallel, it is 
considering whether geo-blocking sometimes may be an infringement on EU 
competition policy. As blocking requirements are often included in contractual 
and distribution agreements for e-commerce and the licensing of audiovisual 
content services, the EC is concerned that such practices may constitute 
illegal barriers to cross-border shopping.  
 
Intellectual Property 
 
The protection of intellectual property rights on the Internet is of course an 
enormously complex and contested issue-area. The precise governance 
principles, mix of rights and obligations, treatment of circumvention 
technologies and modalities of enforcement are just a few of the vast range of 
issues that have been addressed with respect to copyright, trademark, 
patents in the Internet environment. Such issues and their relationships to 
internationally protected rights, such as those enshrined in Article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, have been rendered the focus of 
renewed controversy by the relevant provisions of the TPP deal reached in 
October 2015, which critics charge constitutes an unbalanced overextension 
of intellectual property protections on the Internet.77 
 
Here again, we need not wade deep into these waters for the purpose of this 
paper. Our concern is solely with the relationships between certain 
infrastructure-related techniques of rights protection and Internet 
fragmentation.  
 
A reasonable baseline from which to depart is offered by the Internet 
Society’s moderate stance that, “The infringement of intellectual property 
rights is a critical issue that needs to be addressed, but, at the same time, it 
must be addressed in ways that do not undermine the global architecture of 
the Internet or curtail internationally recognized rights.”78 Accordingly, it 
recommends that intellectual property policy processes be conducted in a 
manner that is multistakeholder and transparent; based on rule of law 
considerations like due process, equality of rights, fairness, transparency, the 
right to be heard and legal certainty; and that the “innovation without 
permission” that made the Internet what it is should be preserved. 
 
There is room for debate as to whether the current mix of national laws and 
international policy regimes strikes the right balances on these scores. With 
regard to preserving the Internet’s fundamental architecture, some types of 
fragmentation conceivably could ensue if policies and standards are locked in 
based on existing technologies rather than being technology neutral. 
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Similarly, some actions involving the underlying infrastructure could have 
fragmenting effects.  
 
Consider, for example, the PROTECT IP Act (Preventing Real Online Threats 
to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act, or PIPA) 
legislation that was introduced in the US Senate in May 2011, and the similar 
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) legislation that was introduced in the US 
House of Representatives in October 2011. The two bills provided remedies 
that varied somewhat in their details, but in general sought to give the US 
government and copyright holders new abilities to block access to what were 
deemed “rogue” websites dedicated to the sale of rights infringing or 
counterfeit goods. Domain name servers were to prevent certain name from 
resolving to IP addresses of infringing websites, and search engines were to 
remove or disable their links to such sites.  
 
A variety of concerns were raised about the scope of the blocking, its 
relationship to questions of freedom expression and fair use, and so on. What 
matters here is that such laws would have effectively turned the Internet’s 
neutral naming and numbering system into a weapon for blocking content, 
based on one country’s preferences. In addition, they could have inspired a 
backlash against US position in Internet governance and US firms more 
generally, or incentivized other countries to adopt similarly constructed laws 
for whatever local purposes. The legislation did not move forward after a 
worldwide oppositional campaign on the part of technology companies, civil 
society activists and others that included coordinated blackouts by Wikipedia, 
Google and thousands of websites. But use of the Internet’s naming and 
numbering system to block content arguably would constitute a significant 
form of fragmentation on the Internet. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this section we have highlighted six kinds of current or potential 
fragmentation related to commercial practices: 
 
1. Potential changes in interconnection agreements 
2. Potential proprietary technical standards impeding interoperability in the 
IoT 
3. Blocking, throttling, or other discriminatory departures from network 
neutrality 
4. Walled gardens 
5. Geo-blocking of content 
6. Potential use of naming and numbering to block content for the purpose of 
intellectual property protection 
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5. Conclusions  
 
We have identified 28 examples of current or potential fragmentation of the 
Internet at both the technical and content and transactions layers. This is 
admittedly a bit much to digest in order to weigh their respective significance 
and the necessity of taking steps to redress them. Hence, we would like to 
suggest a “top 10” set of issues that merit further attention. This is not to 
suggest that the others we have covered are necessarily less important, 
although some – most notably of the technical fragmentation variety – may be 
more bothersome than worrying and/or could well be worked out through 
efforts already under way. Rather, our 10 comprise cases that are a) fairly 
pressing or at least worth keeping a close watch of; b) worth examining in 
greater detail than was possible in this survey; and/or c) potentially amenable 
to progress through multistakeholder dialogue and collaboration. They are 
summarized in Table 1, below. 
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Table 1: 10 Issues to Watch 
 
Issue Occurrence  Intentionality 
 
Impact Character 
 
 
1. Sustained delays 
or failure to move 
from IPv4 to IPv6 
 
 
Potential 
 
No 
 
High, 
structural 
 
Undesirable 
 
2. Blocking of gTLDs 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
To be watched 
 
 
Undesirable 
 
3. Significant 
alternate root 
systems 
 
 
Presently 
unlikely 
 
Yes 
 
Very high, 
structural 
 
Very undesirable 
 
4. Filtering and 
blocking due to 
content concerns 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
High 
 
 
Undesirable 
 
5. Digital 
protectionism   
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
Can be high 
 
 
Undesirable 
 
6. Local data 
processing and/or 
retention 
requirements 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
Can be high 
 
 
Generally 
undesirable 
 
7. Prohibitions on the 
transborder 
movement of certain 
categories of 
commercial data 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
Can be high 
 
 
Generally 
undesirable 
 
8. Strategies for 
“national Internet 
segments” or 
“cybersovereignty”  
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
High, 
potentially 
structural 
 
Undesirable 
 
9. Walled gardens 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
Can be high 
 
 
Views vary 
 
 
10. Geo-blocking 
 
 
Current practice 
 
Yes 
 
Can be high 
 
 
Views vary 
 
 
Taking into account these 10 key cases to watch and the preceding 
discussion, five sets of challenges stand out as being both pressing and 
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particularly amenable to productive analysis and multi-stakeholder dialogue 
and cooperation.  
 
Data Localization 
 
The evidence suggests that governments of various stripes are pursuing 
forms of data localization. The nominal rationales for these courses of action 
differ across countries. Some governments have said that localization is 
needed to protect their citizens’ personal privacy or insulation from foreign 
surveillance operations. Others may be motivated by economic development 
considerations and the expectation that localization will stimulate their 
domestic industries. An additional concern could be ensuring access to 
important information that is currently held abroad for the purposes of law 
enforcement. Whatever the motivations are, the potential costs and benefits 
of such policies should be carefully assessed based on both 
conceptual/empirical analyses and consultations with the range of effected 
stakeholders, including e.g. cloud computing operators, user industries, law 
enforcement agencies, the technical community and civil society. 
 
Digital Protectionism 
 
Digital trade and protectionism is a broad arena that goes well beyond the 
question of fragmentation. But one aspect stands out as potentially useful to 
explore: the application of international trade rules to data flows and 
localization. For example, the electronic commerce chapter of the TPP 
agreement contains an Article on Cross-Border Transfer of Information by 
Electronic Means that requires each government to allow such transfers, 
including with respect to personal information, when the activity is for the 
conduct of the business of a covered person. Parties to the agreement can 
adopt or maintain measures inconsistent with this requirement if these a) are 
not applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade; or b) do not impose 
restrictions on the transfer of information that are greater than what is needed 
to achieve the government’s objectives. Similarly, the chapter’s Article on 
Location of Computing Facilities states that governments shall not require a 
covered person to use or locate computing facilities in their territories as a 
condition for doing business there. Again, governments can adopt or maintain 
measures inconsistent with this requirement if they meet the tests of a) and 
b).  
 
How do we assess what measures with respect to data flows or the location 
of computing facilities meet these tests? Of course, one could simply wait for 
the agreement to be ratified and tested and for challenges on these grounds 
to be sorted out by international trade lawyers. But the machinery of dispute 
settlement will take time, and by then the policies in question could have 
become entrenched and costly. It could be useful in the meanwhile to have 
some initial analysis and dialogue between governments and stakeholders 
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about what actions might constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or 
disguised restrictions on trade; and what actions might exceed what is 
needed to achieve the government’s objectives with respect to restrictions on 
data flows and the location of facilities. 
 
Access via Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) 
 
One reason that has been cited by some governments for keeping data local 
is the difficulty faced by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in obtaining 
prompt access to critical information held abroad. Many governments say that 
access is a particular problem with respect to the United States, since the 
information being sought often is held by US-based technology companies. 
As a study for the Global Network Initiative points out, “Efficiency is critical so 
that law enforcement sees MLA as the best way to access data across 
jurisdictions, rather than demanding data localization or attempting to apply 
local law extraterritorially.”79  
 
The widely lamented problem is that the MLAT system is not working 
efficiently, in part because of constraints imposed by the US Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act. As one analysis summarizes, “Foreign 
governments seeking the content of communications (e.g. emails) that are 
held in another jurisdiction by US-based companies must make government-
to-government requests for the data – even if the data is relevant solely for 
the investigation of local crime. In order to ultimately get the data, they must 
obtain a warrant from a US judge based on probable cause – a process that 
takes an average of 10 months. Foreign governments must go through this 
process even when they are investigating a local crime involving a local victim 
and a local suspect, and the only connection to the United States is that the 
data happens to be held by a US firm.”80 Accordingly, the authors of this 
analysis have proposed a framework for MLAT reform that establishes a 
series of principles that would allow a government that meets basic human 
rights, due process standards and transparency standards to get expedited 
assistance regarding non-US citizens and residents. 
 
Another solution has been advanced by Brad Smith of Microsoft: “We need an 
international legal framework – an international convention – to create 
surveillance and data-access rules across borders.”81 Such a convention 
could supplement the existing MLAT rules. The process could start small by 
only involving governments that have effective due processes, so as to avoid 
the system being abused to violate human rights; other governments could 
subsequently find they have incentives to comply with the standards and join. 
Whichever approach is followed, it is clear that improving access to data held 
abroad, particularly by US-based firms, is an important issue to which 
governments need answers and on which multistakeholder dialogue could be 
fruitful. 
 
 
 62 
 
Walled Gardens 
 
In meetings held during the preparation of this paper, World Economic Forum 
community members expressed a clear interest in further analysis and 
multistakeholder dialogue on these commercial practices. The applications, 
platforms and initiatives that have been so labelled by stakeholders and 
analysts are increasingly integral to daily life, and yet some have faced 
questions about their business models and implementation. More “deep dive” 
analysis into the arguments about Internet fragmentation and inclusive 
dialogue among the relevant stakeholders could help to clarify the issues and 
more clearly identify win/win opportunities for consideration. 
 
Information Sharing 
 
There are a number of opportunities here to contribute to enhanced policy-
making and cooperation on Internet fragmentation and openness. First, there 
is great variability in the quality of the measurements and data that are 
available. With regard to technical fragmentation, companies and 
organizations responsible for managing or coordinating elements of the 
Internet could provide some pieces of the puzzle, but these may not be 
formulated and presented in a manner that is readily accessible to non-
engineers. With regard to governmental fragmentation, information on 
individual examples of e.g. filtering, blocking or attack incidents are much 
easier to come by than systematic data sets revealing current global 
conditions or patterns. In other cases, it is not clear what “hard numbers” 
could be devised to capture the actions in question. For commercial 
fragmentation the same challenges arise; some actions may be detected and 
measured while others do not lend themselves to this. Any future efforts to 
“drill down” on particular manifestations of fragmentation and nail down their 
incidence and costs to different actors or society more generally would thus 
face challenges that might best be addressed through collaborative networks 
that monitor and share data.  
 
Support for one recent development could be helpful here. On 18 December 
2015, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (which comprises the IETF’s 
chair and area directors) approved publication of “An HTTP Status Code to 
Report Legal Obstacles”.82 This will become a formal Request for Comment, 
used by IETF engineers to develop technical standards. At present, when a 
server returns a “403 Forbidden” HTTP status code, the user probably will not 
know why access to the desired resource was denied. But the proposed new 
status code message would return a “451 Unavailable For Legal Reasons” 
message when the material has been blocked for such reasons (the 
designation 451 is apparently in honour of the Ray Bradbury, author of the 
science fiction work, Fahrenheit 451). More specific reasons conceivably 
could be provided as well. This would provide transparency when laws or 
public policies affect server operations and could be used by websites and 
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platforms that are forced to block access. Software could crawl the web 
periodically and aggregate the incidents into publicly accessible online 
databases. 
 
---- 
 
This paper has provided an overview of current and potential instances of 
technical, governmental and commercial fragmentation of and on the Internet. 
The hope is that providing an overview of this complex terrain and its highly 
variable parts, policy-makers and stakeholders will have a holistic baseline 
against which to consider in more detail specific instances of fragmentation 
and the range of options available for their remediation. Being aware of signs 
of fragmentation bubbling up in the Internet ecosystem is a prerequisite to 
acting to promote an open Internet in the future. 
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